Promoting Residential Integration Through the Fair Housing Act: Are Qui Tam Actions a Viable Method of Enforcing “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” Violations? by Termine, Matthew J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 3 Article 17 
November 2011 
Promoting Residential Integration Through the Fair Housing Act: 
Are Qui Tam Actions a Viable Method of Enforcing “Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing” Violations? 
Matthew J. Termine 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew J. Termine, Promoting Residential Integration Through the Fair Housing Act: Are Qui Tam 
Actions a Viable Method of Enforcing “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” Violations?, 79 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1367 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss3/17 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
  
1367 
PROMOTING RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION 
THROUGH THE FAIR HOUSING ACT:  ARE QUI 
TAM ACTIONS A VIABLE METHOD OF 
ENFORCING “AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING 
FAIR HOUSING” VIOLATIONS? 
Matthew J. Termine* 
This Note uses United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro 
New York, Inc. v. Westchester County as an entry point into a discussion 
of residential segregation, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and enforcement of 
the FHA’s desegregation provision—the “Affirmatively Furthering Fair 
Housing” (AFFH) duties.  This Note explains why the Anti-Discrimination 
Center selected a qui tam action via the Federal False Claims Act to 
enforce Westchester’s duties.  After highlighting the inadequacies of the 
FHA enforcement scheme, this Note explores the viability of qui tam as a 
solution. 
Two issues are central to determining whether qui tam is a viable 
solution.  First, a circuit split concerning the admissibility of information 
garnered through Freedom of Information Act requests in qui tam actions 
threatens to prevent national adoption of Anti-Discrimination Center-type 
actions.  Second, this Note places qui tam enforcement of AFFH duties 
within the context of “public law” litigation and analyzes where such 
actions stand relative to commentators’ criticism and support for “public 
law” litigation.  This Note concludes that the circuit split should be 
resolved in favor of admitting Freedom of Information Act evidence and 
that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions have the potential to 
withstand some common pitfalls observed in traditional “public law” 
litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION:  UNITED STATES EX REL. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CENTER OF 
METRO NEW YORK, INC. V. WESTCHESTER COUNTY 
In August 2009, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York (the 
Center), together with the U.S. Department of Justice, won an extraordinary 
$62.5 million settlement in a residential desegregation case against 
Westchester County, New York (Westchester).1  The size of the settlement, 
which represented seven years of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development2 (HUD) funding to Westchester, was not the only 
extraordinary characteristic.  The way in which the Center initiated the 
litigation was also extraordinary and the creativity required to improve 
 
 1. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester 
Cnty., No. 06-cv-2860-DLC, slip op. at 37 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009) (approving the 
settlement reached between the United States, the Anti-Discrimination Center (the Center) 
and Westchester County (Westchester)); Press Release, Anti-Discrimination Center., Inc. of 
Metro New York, Anti-Discrimination Center Wins Unprecedented $62.5 Million 
Settlement In Housing De-Segregation Case Against Westchester County (Aug. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/ADCrelease20090810.pdf 
[hereinafter Anti-Discrimination Center Press Release]. 
 2. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was created as a 
cabinet-level executive agency through the enactment of the Department of Housing 
Development Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3532–3533 (2006) (establishing HUD, describing 
the general duties of the Secretary of HUD and establishing posts for eight assistant 
secretaries, general counsel, and declaring that each officer of HUD shall be appointed by 
the President); see Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/about/mission (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) 
(“HUD’s mission is to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality 
affordable homes for all.”).  In fiscal year 2009, HUD’s budget was $41.833 Billion. U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY 2010 BUDGET:  ROAD MAP FOR TRANSFORMATION 2–3 
(2009) [hereinafter HUD’S FY 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL].  The vast majority of this money 
was distributed through five categories of programs:  tenant-based rental assistance (38% of 
budget); project-based rental assistance (17%); the Public Housing Operating Fund (11%); 
Community Development Block Grants (9%); and Homeless Assistance Grants (4%). See id. 
(stating HUD’s total budget and individual program spending). 
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conditions in Westchester highlighted one of the many legal hurdles 
Westchester faced in advancing residential integration.3 
In United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York v. 
Westchester County,4 the Center used a novel approach, asserting the 
ancient qui tam action5 by way of the Federal False Claims Act (FCA).6  
The liability theory took advantage of a complicated fund-granting 
mechanism used by HUD that requires all HUD grantees such as 
Westchester County to certify that they are in compliance with the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA).7  The fund-granting mechanism requires grantees to 
undertake a very specific analysis of the grantee’s community, an Analysis 
of Impediments, to determine what “impediments to fair housing choice” 
exist and explain how the federal funds will be used to overcome the 
impediments.8  Among the particular requirements of this analysis is a 
HUD mandate that grantees analyze and consider racial impediments such 
as the concentration of minority groups.9  Underlying HUD’s fund-granting 
mechanism is a desire on the part of HUD to fulfill its statutory duty under 
 
 3. Two more conventional approaches to housing desegregation litigation are:  (1) 
alleging that HUD itself has failed to comply with a provision of the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) or (2) alleging intentional discrimination on the part of local officials. See Thompson 
v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 524 (D. Md. 2005) (holding 
HUD liable for locating housing projects within heavily segregated Baltimore City and 
failing to consider locations in surrounding communities); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. 
Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (holding the Chicago Housing Authority liable 
for a “deliberate policy to separate the races”). 
 4. No. 06 Civ. 02860 (DLC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009).  
 5. Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in 
hac parte sequitur, which translates to:  “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this 
matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).  A qui tam action is defined as an 
“action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which 
the government or some specified public institution will receive.” Id.; see also United States 
ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 738 (3d Cir. 1997) (defining qui tam as 
when a “private person with knowledge of fraud against the government, acting as a de facto 
‘attorney general,’ [instigates] litigation on the government’s behalf against the parties 
responsible”). 
 6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.  Recently, the False Claims Act (FCA) has been in the 
headlines in connection with the UBS tax evasion scandal. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, 
Banker Aims at Billions for Blowing the Whistle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, at B1.  Bradley 
C. Birkenfield, a former private banker at UBS, the Swiss bank, tipped federal authorities off 
to business practices that allowed wealthy Americans to hide billions of dollars overseas. Id.  
Although Birkenfield was implicated in the scheme and sentenced to forty months in federal 
prison, his attorneys have alleged a claim to “several billion dollars” of the recovery via the 
FCA. Id. 
 7. 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a) (2010) (requiring “certifications, satisfactory to HUD, [to be] 
included in the [grantee’s] annual submission to HUD”). 
 8. Id. § 91.225(a)(1) (requiring each jurisdiction to “submit a certification that it will 
affirmatively further fair housing, which means that it will conduct an analysis to identify 
impediments to fair housing choice within the jurisdiction [and] take appropriate actions to 
overcome the effects of any impediments identified”). 
 9. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE 2–8 
[hereinafter FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE] (defining impediments to fair housing choice 
as “any actions, omissions, or decisions which have the effect of restricting housing choices 
or the availability of housing choices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, disability, 
familial status, or national origin.” (emphasis added)). 
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the FHA to “affirmatively . . . further” fair housing (AFFH)10 and facilitate 
the grantee’s fulfillment of their independent statutory duty to AFFH.11  
The certification process minimizes potential HUD liability because HUD 
only grants funds when grantees have affirmatively certified that they are in 
compliance with the FHA.12  Furthermore, it overlays the grantee’s 
independent AFFH duty with a contractual assertion that is subject to FCA 
actions such as the qui tam action initiated by the Center.13 
The Center succeeded in its action against Westchester, but the question 
remains:  Why did the Center rely on the particularities of HUD’s fund-
granting mechanism and commence such a complex and costly14 qui tam 
litigation against Westchester?  Contrary to lawyerly intuition, the Center 
did not select the qui tam action because it was the most advantageous of 
various theories of liability that it could have used against Westchester.15  
In fact, as this Note will explain, the qui tam action might have been the 
only theory of liability available to a private party, such as the Center, 
challenging Westchester’s actions.16  The FHA’s enforcement scheme does 
not include a direct cause of action against HUD grantees for failure to 
comply with AFFH duties, and this Note suggests that a causal link may 
exist between this deficiency and the persistency of residential segregation 
in the United States. 
Over forty years after the passage of the FHA, our cities and suburbs 
remain highly segregated.17  Although alarming, this finding should not be 
 
 10. Throughout this Note, “AFFH” will be used to refer to the FHA requirement that all 
federal funds be used “affirmatively to further” fair housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5). 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (stating that “[a]ll executive departments and agencies shall 
administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development . . . in a 
manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this subchapter” (emphasis added)); FAIR 
HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at 1–2 (defining “affirmatively furthering fair 
housing” as a requirement that grantees (1) conduct an analysis to identify impediments to 
fair housing choice within the jurisdiction; (2) take appropriate actions to overcome the 
effects of any impediments identified through the analysis; and (3) maintain records 
“reflecting the analysis and actions taken in this regard”). 
 12. Cf. Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(explaining that one of HUD’s main sources of pressure is withholding funds to HUD 
grantees for noncompliance). 
 13. See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc.  v. 
Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that “[i]n order to 
state a claim premised on a ‘legally false’ certification theory, the defendant must have 
certified compliance with a statute or regulation ‘as a condition to governmental payment’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 14. See Nat’l Comm’n on Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Pub. Hearing at 4 (Sept. 22, 
2008) (testimony of Michael Allen) (noting that the qui tam litigation technique used by the 
Center is “expensive”). 
 15. See id. (recommending that Congress “[m]ake the AFFH obligation enforceable by 
private parties (including fair housing and other community groups) who are knowledgeable 
about impediments to fair housing and about appropriate actions to overcome those 
impediments”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS FOR THE PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE, 
CHANGING AMERICA:  INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING BY RACE 
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 67 (Sept. 1998), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/ca/pdfs/ca.pdf 
[hereinafter INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING] (reporting that non-
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completely unexpected.  The FHA was enacted 102 years after the 
Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery.  During this century-long period, 
housing discrimination was widespread in the private sector as well as in 
local and national government.18  By the time the FHA was enacted in 
1968, much of the damage had already been done; the freight train of 
residential segregation had been put into motion and only decisive 
affirmative action could reverse its course.19  To combat this, the FHA 
focuses its efforts on prohibiting discrimination in housing markets—as 
complemented by a formal enforcement scheme.20  However, the FHA’s 
only true desegregative tool—the AFFH provision—attached to all federal 
money channeled through HUD is not afforded a statutory enforcement 
scheme.21  As one of the only desegregation tools available to parties such 
as the Center, it is important to determine whether the qui tam action is a 
viable alternative to a formal enforcement scheme within the FHA. 
This Note uses Anti-Discrimination Center as an entry point into a 
discussion of residential segregation, the FHA, and enforcement of the 
FHA’s desegregation provision—the AFFH duties.  This Note attempts to 
explain why the Center used the qui tam action and what this tells us about 
the inadequacies of the FHA enforcement scheme.  Pointing to the potential 
inadequacies, this Note explores the viability of qui tam as a solution.  Two 
issues, the first practical and the second theoretical, are central to the qui 
tam viability discussion.  The first issue is the relevance of the circuit split 
at the heart of Westchester’s motion to dismiss to future Anti-
 
Hispanic blacks, on average, live in neighborhoods composed of less than 30% percent non-
Hispanic whites even though non-Hispanic whites make up almost 75% of the overall 
population); PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, BROOKINGS INST., STUNNING PROGRESS, HIDDEN 
PROBLEMS:  THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE 1990S 5 fig.2 (May 
2003) (reporting that nearly three out of four people living in neighborhoods of high 
concentrations of poverty were black or Latino). 
 18. See CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960:  
PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 64 (2005) (noting that George Romney’s Operation 
Breakthrough faced “towering obstacles to suburban integration” such as exclusionary 
zoning measures); Guido Calabresi, Preface to THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TWENTY 
YEARS 7 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989) (noting that the FHA and Veteran’s Association 
mortgage assistance programs “until the late 1950s explicitly rejected the development of 
integrated communities”). 
 19. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 63–64 tbl.3.1 (1993) (noting that the average northern 
city had a black-white dissimilarity of 84.5% in 1970—meaning that over 84% of blacks 
“would have to move to achieve an even, or ‘integrated,’ residential configuration”). 
 20. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting 
that the FHA was “designed primarily to prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, financing, 
or brokerage of private housing and to provide federal enforcement procedures for 
remedying such discrimination”). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006) (defining “discriminatory housing practice” as “an 
act that is unlawful” under § 3604 (discrimination in the sale or rental of housing), § 3605 
(discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions), § 3606 (discrimination in the 
provision of brokerage services) or § 3617 (interference, coercion, or intimidation), but not 
including failure to comply with § 3608(e)(5)). 
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Discrimination Center-type actions.22  Second, this Note places use of qui 
tam to enforce AFFH duties within the context of “public law” litigation 
and determines where it stands relative to support for, and criticism of, 
“public law” litigation. 
Part I places Anti-Discrimination Center in historical context and 
describes the legislative history of both the FHA and the FCA.  Part II 
presents a circuit split over whether qui tam actions based on state or 
municipal “administrative reports” are barred by the FCA’s public 
disclosure.  Part III concludes that state or municipal reports should not be 
barred because admission of such reports is consistent with the purpose of 
the FCA.  Part IV places Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions within the 
paradigm of “public law” litigation and discusses some advantages and 
disadvantages of using qui tam as an enforcement mechanism.  Part V 
concludes that qui tam has potential as an enforcement mechanism of the 
FHA’s desegregation provision.   
I.  SEGREGATION, THE FAIR HOUSING ACT, AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 
Part I places Anti-Discrimination Center in historical context and 
describes the legislative history of both the FHA and the FCA.  Part I.A 
explains the societal forces behind residential segregation and introduces 
theories as to why residential segregation is difficult to eradicate.   
Part I.B turns to the enactment of the FHA.  A brief legislative history of 
the FHA is presented that attempts to distinguish between the intentions of 
Congress as a whole and the intentions of the framers of the FHA.  Turning 
to federal court interpretations of the FHA, this Note focuses on the AFFH 
duties of § 3608(e)(5).  This part compares the enforcement mechanism 
supporting the anti-discrimination provisions with the enforcement 
provisions of § 3608(e)(5) and highlights the inability of parties such as the 
Center to bring direct actions against HUD grantees. 
Part I.C explains HUD’s Community Development Block Grant program 
with the aim of detailing the types of missteps that lead to Anti-
Discrimination Center-type grantee liability.  The process of analyzing 
impediments to fair housing is explained and connected to the enforcement 
of the AFFH duties.  Part I.C.3 turns to the efficacy of relying on HUD to 
enforce AFFH duties and points out potential problems with the 
enforcement scheme.  Part I.C also introduces benefits and disadvantages of 
overlaying the HUD enforcement scheme with “public law” litigation 
enforcement. 
Part I.D connects the FCA and qui tam actions to residential 
desegregation litigation.  A brief history of the FCA is offered in Part I.D.1.  
Part I.D.2 then turns to the inner workings of the modern FCA and the 
public disclosure bar which limits parasitic actions “based on” publicly 
available information. 
 
 22. Throughout this Note, “Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions” will refer to a 
private party’s use of the qui tam provisions of the FCA to enforce HUD grantees’ AFFH 
obligations. 
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Part I.E concludes Part I with a discussion of the paradigm of “public 
law” litigation,23 with the hope of understanding where the Anti-
Discrimination Center action stands in relation to other private actions 
enforcing “public laws.”  This concept is originally presented by the late 
Harvard Law School Professor Abram Chayes, in his piece, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation,24 Chayes detailed the distinction between 
traditional litigation that is a “vehicle for settling disputes between private 
parties about private rights”25 and “public law litigation,” which is a mode 
of litigation that uses the courts to foster social change.26  This section sets 
up the framework to judge the viability of using Anti-Discrimination 
Center-type actions to enforce AFFH obligations. 
A.  The Complicated Problem of Residential Segregation 
Understanding the chronological development of residential segregation 
will aid in the discussion of whether the qui tam action is a viable method 
of enforcing the AFFH duties and solving the problem of residential 
segregation.  Part I.A.1 introduces residential segregation as an artificial 
phenomenon rooted in our country’s long history of individual and 
institutional discrimination.  The evolution of segregation forces is tracked 
between the Civil War and Civil Rights Era.  Part I.A.2 confronts the 
proposition that segregation has persisted in the face of extensive civil 
rights reform including explicit prohibitions of discrimination in the 
housing markets.  Two theories are presented that elucidate the complexity 
of modern day residential segregation.  The first theory attempts to explain 
how barely-measureable racial preferences can lead to staggeringly 
segregated residential neighborhoods.  The second theory presents a unique 
characteristic of neighborhood selection and shows how an uneven income 
distribution amongst the races can have a drastic impact on residential 
segregation outcomes.  The complexity of the segregation problem, as 
depicted through the two theories in Part I.A.2, are relevant to the 
discussion of the viability of Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions in 
Parts II and III. 
1.  Artificial Beginning 
When residential segregation is viewed as a late-blooming offshoot of the 
institution of slavery, the artificial and insidious nature of racial isolation 
 
 23. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1284 (1976) (listing the “characteristic features of the public law model” as:  (1) a 
“party structure [that is] sprawling and amorphous”; (2) “traditional adversary relationship 
[that] is suffused and intermixed with negotiating and mediating”; and (3) a “trial judge [who 
is] the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which have widespread 
effects on persons not before the court,” but noting that different fields “display in varying 
degrees the features of public law litigation”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1282. 
 26. Id. at 1281–82. 
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shines through.27  The early origins can be traced back to a ghetto-creating 
trifecta:  (1) the economic status of African Americans in the late nineteenth 
century, (2) the high concentration of African Americans in southern states 
at that time, and (3) the rapid urbanization of northern cities during the 
industrial revolution.28 
In 1870, eighty percent of all blacks lived in the rural south.29  Housing 
in the South was largely integrated—a fact attributable to the preceding 
years of slavery and the practice of housing slaves close to their master’s 
compound.30  Despite their integration, southern African Americans lived in 
“appalling poverty relative to their white counterparts.”31  White 
southerners took advantage of the vulnerable position of blacks by binding 
them in sharecropping contracts that strongly favored the white landowners 
and merchants.32  Black codes33 reinforced the master-slave dichotomy and 
maintained the status quo:  economic subordination of the newly freed 
slaves.34  This concentration of economically disadvantaged blacks set the 
stage for an industrial revolution-induced black migration to cities and the 
creation of segregated urban ghettos. 35 
 
 27. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 19 (“The emergence of the black ghetto 
did not happen as a chance by-product of other socioeconomic processes.”); REPORT OF THE 
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMM’N 
REPORT] (“[W]hite society is deeply implicated in the ghetto.  White institutions created it, 
white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”); C. Michael Henry, 
Introduction:  Historical Overview of Race and Poverty from Reconstruction to 1969, in 
RACE, POVERTY AND DOMESTIC POLICY 1, 7 (C. Michael Henry ed., 2004) (describing “the 
problems of race and poverty [as] a significant part of the damning legacies of slavery”); 
Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation:  Links Between Residential Segregation 
and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795, 803 (1996) (arguing that “segregation was 
not a normal or natural part” of the growth experienced by northern cities and a “host of 
private, public, and governmental actors deliberately created residential segregation”). 
 28. See infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text. 
 29. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 18. 
 30. See id. at 25 (noting that in the South, “African Americans were scattered widely 
among urban neighborhoods and were more likely to share neighborhoods with whites than 
with members of their own group”).  This practice was designed, in part, “to prevent the 
formation of a cohesive African American Society.” Id. at 24.  However, southern residential 
segregation increased during the antebellum period as former slaves moved away from their 
master’s compound. See STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT 
DOOR:  SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 14–15 (2000) 
(describing segregation in the South during the antebellum period). 
 31. Henry, supra note 27, at 1. 
 32. Roger L. Ransom & Richard Sutch, Debt Peonage in the Cotton South After the 
Civil War, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 641, 655 (1972) (noting the weak position of the indebted 
tenants relative to the landlord). 
 33. John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast:  Demise of the “State Action” Limit on the 
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 869 (1966) (describing the “Black 
Codes” as laws “which severely restricted [African Americans] in the enjoyment of rights 
which the law affirmatively protected for . . . white citizen[s]” and prejudiced African 
Americans “in such areas of life and commerce as purchase of realty, equality of criminal 
penalties and proceedings, trade or business”). 
 34. KIRT H. WILSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION DESEGREGATION DEBATE:  THE POLITICS OF 
EQUALITY AND THE RHETORIC OF PLACE, 1870–1875, at 13 (2002) (noting that “[t]he North 
might call the former slaves ‘freedmen,’ [while] South Carolina law . . . maintain[ed] the 
caste system that defined ‘servants’ in very different terms than their ‘masters’”). 
 35. Id. 
1376 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
In the years following the January 1863 implementation of the 
Emancipation Proclamation,36 growing numbers of African Americans 
moved to northern and midwestern cities.37  Race relations in the North 
remained, for the most part, stable and only modest levels of residential 
segregation existed.38  Sociologists and historians note the development of a 
class of elite African American professionals that served white clients as 
lawyers and doctors.39  By 1916, the migration40 achieved an increased 
intensity as the military-industrial build-up to World War I drew more than 
500,000 African Americans over the next three years from the rural south to 
northern and midwestern cities.41  This influx had a dramatic effect on race 
relations and “[n]orthern whites viewed this rising tide of black migration 
with increasing hostility and considerable alarm.”42  An upsurge in racial 
violence and a decrease in white willingness to interact and transact 
business with African Americans virtually eliminated the existence of the 
class of elite African American professionals, creating an increasingly 
exclusionary environment for newly arrived African American city-
dwellers.43  The seeds of tense race relations were planted by the 1960s, 
when another 1.38 million blacks left the South for northern cities.44 
White northerner’s decreased willingness to interact with blacks 
amplified the effect of institutional structures, further entrenching the 
segregation of the races.  Racially restrictive covenants—provisions written 
into property deeds preventing the transfer of property to certain races—
were used throughout the Great Migration.45  Despite the 1948 invalidation 
of racially restrictive covenants,46 for the next twenty years the covenants 
 
 36. 12 Stat. 1268 (1863) (declaring, through two executive orders, that those slaves of 
the Confederate States of America not returning to Union control by January 1, 1863 were 
free). 
 37. See CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960:  
PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 27 (2005) (noting only 400,000 African Americans left 
the South in the 1930s followed by nearly 1.5 million in the 1940s and again in the 1960s); 
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 27–29 (noting that the “outflow” of African 
Americans was only 70,000 during the 1870s and 80,000 during the 1880s compared to 
877,000 in the 1920s); MEYER, supra note 30, at 30. 
 38. See MEYER, supra note 30, at 13. 
 39. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 22, 23 (describing the small but highly 
successful black elite class in Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee). 
 40. See Karl Taeuber, Causes of Residential Segregation, in THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
AFTER TWENTY YEARS 33, 34 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989) (referring to the migration of 
southern African Americans to northern and midwestern cities as the “great migration”). 
 41. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 29 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 34 (noting that the “initial impetus for ghetto formation came from a wave of 
racial violence . . . that swept over northern cities in the period between 1900 and 1920”). 
 44. REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 
IN AMERICA 113 (1987). 
 45. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR 
HOUSING 7 (2008) (noting that “deeds in nearly every new housing development in the North 
prevented the use or ownership of homes by anyone other than the Caucasian race” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that the states “in granting 
judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements . . . have denied petitioners the equal 
protection of the laws [and] therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand”).  The FHA 
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continued to be incorporated into deeds as unenforceable but “valuable 
signals for current and would-be property owners in covenanted 
neighborhoods.”47  Blockbusting, a “real estate practice[] in which brokers 
encourage[d] owners to list their homes for sale by exploiting fears of racial 
change within [the owner’s] neighborhood,” was commonplace between the 
late 1950s and late 1960s.48  The Federal Housing Administration, the 
federal government mortgage lending arm, disseminated guidelines to field 
offices that called for protection of neighborhoods from the “infiltration of 
inharmonious racial groups.”49  Attitudes of white northerners and 
institutional actions provided more than sufficient staying power, but these 
triggered yet another segregation force:  white flight.50  As racial tension 
increased and institutional players pushed whites and blacks into, and then 
out of, city neighborhoods, whites, with the requisite mobility, eventually 
fled to the suburbs.51  These forces set the stage for an internalization of 
residential segregation’s staying power.52  By the time Congress and the 
courts prohibited discriminatory individual and institutional action in the 
housing markets, segregation’s internal staying power had taken hold.53 
 
distributed materials recommending the use of racially restrictive covenants even after the 
Shelley decision. See, e.g., FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL:  UNDERWRITING 
AND VALUATION PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT 323 (1936) 
(recommending the use of neighborhood demographics to predict housing valuations); 
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:  THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 208 (1985) (commenting that the materials recommending the racially restrictive 
covenants were used after Shelley). 
 47. See Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins:  Are We Really a Desegregated 
Society?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 58 (1992) (noting anecdotally that a house the author 
purchased in Michigan had a restrictive covenant running in its deed through the 1950s until 
the 1960s); Richard R. W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions 12 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-8, 2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=353723 (arguing that the impact of covenants did not vanish 
after the Supreme Court ruled their enforcement unconstitutional). 
 48. Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting:  Law, Economics, and Race-Based 
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1998); see Taeuber, supra note 
40, at 35 (describing the practice of blockbusting). 
 49. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 46, at 323 (“The infiltration of inharmonious racial 
groups will produce the same effects as those which follow the introduction of 
nonconforming land uses which tend to lower the levels of land values and to lessen the 
desirability of residential areas.”) 
 50. KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 12–13 (stating that the second of two 
related social movements that were causally connected to residential segregation was the 
departure of urban whites from Northern cities to suburban enclaves). 
 51. Cf. Steven E. Asher, Interdistrict Remedies for Segregated Schools, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1168, 1181 (1979) (noting that institutional players such as the FHA-instituted policies 
that encouraged white flight from the cities). 
 52. See infra Part I.A.2 (introducing two theories that may explain the internalization of 
residential segregation’s staying power). 
 53. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 427 (6th ed. 2008) (stating 
that “nearly one third of the African-American population reside in blocks that are more than 
90 percent black, and nearly half of the white population live on blocks that are more than 90 
percent white”); MASSEY & DENTON supra note 19, at 48 tbl.2.4 (stating that the isolation 
index, which measures the extent to which blacks live within neighborhoods that are 
predominantly black, increased in Northern cities from 31.7 in 1930 to 73.5 in 1970).  
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2.  Sophisticated Staying Power 
The relationship between individual choice and aggregate results is 
central to the discussion of the internal staying power of residential 
segregation.  Every time an individual moves into or out of a neighborhood, 
there is a situation in which individual choice impacts the composition of 
both neighborhoods the individual is both moving to and from.54  Nobel 
Laureate and University of Maryland economics professor Thomas 
Schelling55 posits that individual choices in the housing market can 
transform small differences in groups’ attitudes about neighborhood 
diversity into “strikingly polarized results.”56  The Schelling thesis causally 
links “discriminatory individual behavior” to housing segregation, but 
defines “discriminatory” as “an awareness, conscious or unconscious, of 
sex or age or religion or color or whatever” that influences decisions on 
where to live.57  This nuanced definition is at the heart of why Professor 
Schelling’s model is relevant to assessing the efficacy of the FHA in 
integrating our neighborhoods:  the theory uncovers the mechanics behind 
the observation that mere racial awareness perpetuates segregation.   
In setting forth his thesis, Schelling uses so-called chessboard 
experiments in which each chess piece represents a family of one race or 
another.58  He further assumes residents:  (1) are race conscious and (2) 
have a mild racial preference (e.g., whites do not want to be out-numbered 
more than two-to-one and vice versa).59  He begins with a mixed 
 
 54. HGTV, for example, is a television network developed around the search for suitable 
living. See HGTV PROGRAM GUIDE, www.hgtv.com (follow “On TV” hyperlink; then follow 
“Program Guide” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (listing “House Hunters,” “Income 
Property,” “Property Virgins,” “My First Place,” among other house-selection related 
shows). 
 55. Thomas Schelling won the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics along with Robert 
Aumann “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-
theory analysis.” The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel 2005, NOBEL FOUNDATION, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/
2005/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). Although much of Schelling’s work focused on game-
theory, in the 1970s he leveraged his work in the area of individual decision-making to 
analyze the aggregate effects of individual decisions. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, 
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 11–43 (1978). 
 56. W.A.V. Clark, Residential Preferences and Neighborhood Segregation:  A Test of 
the Schelling Segregation Model, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 15 (1991); see also Thomas C. 
Schelling, On the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 PUB. INT. 61, 80–82 (1972) (arguing that 
“processes of separation, segregation, sharing, mixing, dispersal . . . have a feature in 
common.  The consequences are aggregate but the decisions are exceedingly individual”); 
Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 143, 144 
(1971) [hereinafter Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation]. 
 57. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, supra note 56, at 144; see also John 
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:  Equality for the Negro–The Problem of Special 
Treatment, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 390 (1966) (“There exists a ‘tipping point’—a given 
percentage of [African Americans], after which the departure of whites from the areas will 
be greatly accelerated.”) 
 58. See Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, supra note 56, at 144. 
 59. See id.; Tim Harford, The Logic of Life:  Racial Segregation and Thomas Schelling, 
http://timharford.com/2009/03/the-logic-of-life-racial-segregation-and-thomas-schelling/ 
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neighborhood and, in the first round, moves any chess piece that is in a 
neighborhood that fails to meet the family’s mild racial 
preference to a neighborhood that does.60  He repeats this move again and 
again.61  Eventually, the mild racial preference of not wanting to be out-
numbered more than two-to-one in a given neighborhood creates a 
completely segregated environment.62  This example shows that 
“although . . . individuals may be rational and tolerant, the society we 
produce together may be neither rational nor tolerant.”63 
One somewhat unrealistic aspect of the Schelling thesis is that it assumes 
there is perfect mobility between neighborhoods for all residents.64  The 
distribution of economic resources between races is far from uniform and 
this fortifies the staying power of segregation.65  The Tiebout Sorting, 
developed by the late University of Washington economics professor, 
Charles Tiebout,66 says that the mechanics of matching individual 
preferences to public expenditure on the local level is vastly different from 
the same on the national level.67  The basic problem on the national level is 
that often there is a wide range of views on a given issue.  As an example, 
consider the amount of money the federal government decides to spend on 
maintaining our national parks.  Ultimately, the federal government’s 
chosen level of expenditure matches only a sliver of the many individual 
preferences.68  Professor Tiebout argues that this problem does not occur at 
the local level because individuals are free to move in and out of 
neighborhoods based on their local public expenditure preferences.69  
Professor Tiebout views each town as offering a different menu of public 
expenditure (e.g., high or low expenditure on schooling and maintenance of 
 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (presenting a visual demonstration of Schelling’s segregation 
model). 
 60. See John Kaplan, supra note 57, at 390; Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 
supra note 56, at 144. 
 61. See Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, supra note 56, at 144. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 144–45 (accounting for this deficiency and pointing out that this paper 
might be positioned in “third place” behind institutional discrimination and the effect of 
disparities in economic resources between the races). 
 65. See INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING supra note 17, at 35 
(presenting the median family income for African Americans ($26,000), Hispanics 
($26,000), whites ($47,000) and Asians ($49,000); noting that “Asian and non-Hispanic 
white families have much higher median incomes than black or Hispanic families” and 
“[t]he median income of black families as a percentage of non-Hispanic white median family 
income was about the same in 1997 as in 1967, at less than 60 percent”). 
 66. Charles Tiebout revolutionized the way economists think about the free-rider 
problem and spending choices made at the local level. See Peter H. Schuck, Judging 
Remedies:  Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 
303 (2002) (acknowledging the prominence of Tiebout’s theory). 
 67. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON. 416, 
418 (1956) (“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best 
satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”). 
 68. HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 18–21 (Kenneth Joseph Arrow & 
Amartya Sen eds., 2002) (explaining the overarching problem of selecting a level of 
expenditure for a group with varied preferences for the level of spending). 
 69. Tiebout, supra note 67, at 418. 
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city parks).70  Overlaying this theory with the uneven income distribution 
between the races, the diversity in public expenditure from one town to the 
next creates a situation where low-income earners inevitably select towns 
with low public expenditure and correlative low tax rates.71  Together, the 
theories from Professors Schelling and Tiebout help to explain how 
segregation remains despite efforts to root out purposeful discrimination in 
the housing market. 
B.  The Fair Housing Act, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and Enforcement of the Act 
Part I.A.1 detailed some of the social and economic forces behind 
residential segregation.  In Part I.B.1 the U.S. Congress confronts the 
problem of civil disorder and identifies residential segregation as an 
significant precipitating factor.   
1.  The Fair Housing Act and § 3608(e)(5)72 
In the spring of 1967, violent race riots broke out in Newark and 
Detroit.73  Amidst increasing political pressure to ameliorate the rising 
racial tensions, President Lyndon B. Johnson formed the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders (the Commission).74  The President asked 
the Commission to investigate “[t]he origins of the recent major civil 
disorders in our cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such 
disorders.”75  The Commission spent nine months investigating, and 
delivered a comprehensive 426-page document—The Kerner Commission 
Report (the Report)—which begins with the Commission’s basic 
conclusion:  “Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one 
white—separate and unequal.”76  The Commission elevated the issue of 
 
 70. Schuck, supra note 66, at 304 (connecting Tiebout Sorting to residential segregation 
and noting that expenditure differences across localities enables residents with similar taxing 
and spending preferences to group themselves in communities that satisfy them). 
 71. Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and 
Finance:  Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND 
USE CONTROLS:  THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 1, 5 (1975) (“Once we recognize that the demand for 
public services is systematically related to income, we see that the Tiebout model implies 
powerful tendencies toward segregation by income level.”); Alexandra M. Greene, Note, An 
Examination of Tiebout Sorting and Residential Segregation Through a Racialized Lens, 8 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 143–47 (2008) (connecting Tiebout Sorting to the problem of 
residential segregation). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006). 
 73. LAMB, supra note 18, at 41–42 (describing the role that the 1967 riots played in lead 
up to the Kerner Commission Report and passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968). 
 74. Exec. Order No. 11,365, § 3, 32 Fed. Reg. 11111 (Aug. 1, 1967) (establishing the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders). 
 75. Id. at 11112. 
 76. KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 1; see John Charles Boger, Race and the 
American City:  The Kerner Commission in Retrospect—An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 
1289, 1296-97 (1993) (noting the importance of the Commission’s basic conclusion).  The 
opening statement of the Kerner Report continues: 
Reaction to last summer’s disorders has quickened the movement and deepened 
the division.  Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of 
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residential segregation from a mere fact of life in America to one of the 
precipitating factors of the racial riots, labeling it as something that could 
lead to “the destruction of basic democratic values.”77 
The Report outlined three alternative strategies the country could take in 
response to the Report’s central finding:  (1) the “Present Policies Choice” 
would have maintained the status quo of near nonintervention, (2) the 
“Enrichment Choice” would have substantially increased social services in 
inner-city neighborhoods but not have made a concerted effort to integrate, 
and (3) the “Integration” choice would have incentivized a mobilization of 
inner-city African Americans and actively desegregated American cities.78  
Implicit in the conclusions of the Report was recognition that merely ending 
discrimination in the housing markets would not be enough to stem the tide 
of racial isolation and tension in American cities.79 
Congress, at the urging of President Johnson, took notice of the Report80 
and, in the “tense days following the assassination of Martin Luther King, 
Jr.,”81 passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which is now known as the 
FHA.82  Through the Act, Congress acknowledged the connection between 
residential segregation and rising racial tensions.  However, the Act’s focus 
on prohibiting racial discrimination in the housing markets likely reflected 
an unrealistic view of what it would take to solve the residential segregation 
 
American life; they now threaten the future of every American.  This deepening 
racial division is not inevitable.  The movement apart can be reversed.  Choice is 
still possible.  Our principal task is to define that choice and to press for a national 
resolution.  To pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization 
of the American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic 
values. 
KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 1; see also Susan Olzak, Suzanne Shanahan & 
Elizabeth H. McEneaney, Poverty, Segregation, and Race Riots:  1960 to 1993, 61 AM. SOC. 
REV. 590, 607–10 (1996) (reporting results from a sociological study that supports the 
Kerner Report’s finding that racial isolation is correlated with social unrest). 
 77. KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 1. 
 78. Id. at 395–96; see Boger, supra note 76, at 1305 (stating that the Kerner Commission 
“warned America that it must choose among three mutually exclusive policy alternatives”). 
 79. Both the “Enrichment Choice” and the “Integration Choice” emphasize positive 
action on the part of the government instead of mere prohibitions on racial discrimination in 
the housing markets. See Boger, supra note 76, at 1302–03. 
 80. See 114 Cong. Rec. 9557 (1968) (statement of Rep. Anderson) (“In voting for this 
bill I seek . . . to reward and encourage the millions of decent, hardworking, loyal, black 
Americans who do not riot and burn.  I seek to give them the hope that the dream of owning 
a home in the suburbs or a decent apartment in the city will not be denied the man who was 
born black.”); LAMB, supra note 18, at 42 (arguing that the Kerner Report “probably” 
influenced Congress’s views on segregation leading up to the Fair Housing Act of 1968 
vote). 
 81. Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities:  The 
Problem of Fair Housing, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 874, 880 (1988) (noting the connection 
between the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the timing of Congress passing the 
FHA); see also Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing:  A Legislative History and a 
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 149 (1969) (stating that “the assassination of Martin 
Luther King sped action in the House of Representatives”). 
 82. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII (Fair Housing), 82 Stat. 73 
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)). 
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problem.83  The Act provided that racial discrimination in the housing 
markets would be eradicated in three successive phases.84  The first phase 
banned discrimination in either the sale or rental of housing on the basis of 
race, color, religion or national origin in housing owned, operated or 
guaranteed by the federal government.85  The next two phases applied this 
prohibition first to private multi-family dwellings and then to single-family 
dwellings.86  The three-phased attack on discrimination was the principal 
mechanism by which Congress hoped to influence the country to move 
toward an imprecise vision of “fair housing.”87 
The chief architects of the FHA, Senators Edward Brooke and Walter 
Mondale, viewed “fair housing” broadly.88  Their perception of the problem 
and potential solutions aligned more closely with the Report, but it was 
their appreciation for the politics of desegregation that can be credited as 
their enduring legacy.  The architects recognized that an all-out attack on 
segregation through legislative adoption of the “Integration Choice” would 
be politically impractical in 1968.89  They opted for a second-best solution:  
a requirement that all federal funds allocated to affordable housing 
programs be used “affirmatively to further” fair housing.90  In doing so, the 
FHA defers to HUD and the federal courts to define and enforce the AFFH 
 
 83. See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) (“It is 
true that the Act was designed primarily to prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, 
financing, or brokerage of private housing and to provide federal enforcement procedures for 
remedying such discrimination . . . .”); see also Dubofsky, supra note 81, at 158–61 (noting 
that the bulk of Senate floor debate focused on the discrimination provisions).  
 84. See Dubofsky, supra note 81, at 156. 
 85. Id. at 160–61. 
 86. Id. at 161. 
 87. John W. Mashek, President Signs Civil Rights Bill; Pleads for Calm, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 1968, at 1 (noting that the Act’s “major provision is intended to end racial 
discrimination in the sale and rental of [eighty percent] of the nation’s homes and 
apartments”). 
 88. 114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (1968) (statement of Senator Brooke). 
Today’s Federal housing official commonly inveighs against the evils of ghetto 
life even as he pushes buttons that ratify their triumph—even as he OK’s public 
housing sites in the heart of the [African American] slums, releases planning and 
urban renewal funds to cities dead-set against integration, and approves the 
financing of suburban subdivisions from which [African-Americans] will be 
barred.  These and similar acts are committed daily by officials who say they are 
unalterably opposed to segregation, and have the memos to prove it . . . .  But 
when you ask one of these [HUD administrators] why, despite the 1962 fair 
housing order most public housing is still segregated, he invariably blames it on 
regional custom, local traditions, personal prejudices of municipal housing 
officials. 
Id.  Westchester officials used a similar tactic when confronted with their failure to locate 
housing projects outside primarily African-American neighborhoods:  they pointed to the 
municipalities and claimed they had no authority over them to direct placement of the 
projects. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing the reaction of 
Westchester officials); infra Part I.C.1 (discussing the relationship between HUD grantees 
and individual municipalities). 
 89. See Dubofsky, supra note 81, at 159 (noting the negotiating required to pass the 
FHA with virtually no explicit provisions for proactive desegregation). 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006). 
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duty consistent with the Act.91  The next section will examine how the 
courts have interpreted this language. 
2.  Federal Courts and the AFFH Duties of § 3608(e)(5) 
Federal courts have uniformly held that the AFFH requirement of 
§ 3608(e)(5) is functional and not simply a “restate[ment of] HUD’s 
existing legal obligation.”92  In NAACP v. Secretary of Housing & Urban 
Development,93 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reasoned that 
statements of the FHA’s framers do not comport with the theory that the 
AFFH duty is simply a reiteration of the government’s Fifth Amendment 
Equal Protection obligation.94  Interpreting the intent of Senator Brooke, the 
court noted that “a purpose of [the FHA] is to remedy the ‘weak intentions’ 
that have led to the federal government’s ‘sanctioning discrimination in 
housing throughout this Nation.’”95  This court contrasted this idea with 
Senator Brooke’s point that the FHA “does not promise to end the 
ghetto . . . but it will make it possible for those who have the resources to 
escape.”96  The court found that the purpose of the FHA “reflects the desire 
to have HUD use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and 
segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing 
increases.”97 
The First Circuit went on to note that the plain meaning of “affirmatively 
to further” seemed to impose more on HUD than simply a prohibition on 
 
 91. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 92. See, e.g., NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 154 (1st Cir. 
1987) (rejecting HUD’s argument “that § 3608(e)(5) imposes upon HUD only an obligation 
not to discriminate”); Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 
417 (D. Md. 2005) (stating that the duty holds HUD to a “high standard [and] in this case to 
have a commitment to desegregation”); Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 776 F. Supp.  637, 642 
(D. R.I. 1991) (noting that “while HUD has discretion in carrying out its duty, the duty itself 
is not discretionary” and must be exercised in favor of fair housing). 
 93. 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 94. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; NAACP, 817 F.2d at 154.   In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954), the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that in light of the Equal Protection duty 
imposed upon the states, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a 
lesser duty on the Federal Government.” Id. at 500.  Thus, the Court extended Equal 
Protection duties to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Id.  Prior to the enactment of the FHA plaintiffs commonly used Equal 
Protection to prevent HUD and local housing authorities from placing housing projects in 
heavily nonwhite concentrated areas. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. 
Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (holding that the plaintiffs “have the right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to have sites selected for public housing projects without regard to 
the racial composition of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the projects 
themselves.”).  It should be noted that the obligation under Equal Protection only goes so far 
as to say that HUD and local authorities cannot, as the defendants did in Gautreaux, 
intentionally build projects in areas of high racial concentrations. See id. at 583–84 (“A 
showing of affirmative discriminatory state action is required.”); see also id. (dismissing a 
claim that the Chicago Housing Authority violated its duty to select sites for public housing 
in a manner which would alleviate existing patterns of residential segregation). 
 95. NAACP, 817 F.2d at 154 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. 
Brooke)). 
 96. Id. at 154 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (statement of Sen. Brooke)). 
 97. Id. at 155. 
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discrimination.98  The court interpreted the words within the context in 
which they were written and the reality that discrimination had infiltrated 
all aspects of American life.99  If the AFFH language was interpreted as 
merely imposing a prohibition of intentional discrimination on HUD, the 
court reasoned, then fair housing would not be “affirmatively furthered” 
with respect to private and institutional actors that significantly contribute 
to the working of the housing market.100 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports the First Circuit’s interpretation 
of the underlying purpose of the FHA.  The plaintiffs in Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance,101 two current tenants of the apartment 
complex in question, alleged that the actions of the landlord had caused 
them to:  (1) lose the social benefits of living in an integrated community, 
(2) miss out on business opportunities which would arise in an integrated 
environment, and (3) suffer embarrassment and economic damages from 
being stigmatized as living in a “white ghetto.”102  In concluding that the 
current tenant-plaintiffs had standing under the FHA, the Court stated, “The 
person on the landlord’s blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory 
housing practices; [so] is . . . ‘the whole community.’”103  The Court 
reasoned that recognition of standing to a broad range of private actors 
under the act was consistent with Senator Mondale’s vision to move toward 
“truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”104 
a.  Application of § 3608(e)(5) to HUD 
HUD has been found liable under § 3608(e)(5) in two distinct scenarios:  
(1) where HUD itself has failed in its AFFH duty105 and (2) where HUD 
knows of a downstream failure by a grantee to comply with the FHA.106 
In the 1970 decision Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban 
Development,107 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the 
first circuit court to hold HUD liable under theory (1).108  The Shannon 
court explicitly stated that § 3608(e)(5) imparts a duty on HUD to consider 
the impact that a given project might have on an area’s concentration of 
 
 98. Id. at 154. 
 99. See id. at 155. 
 100. Id. at 154 (“[I]t is difficult to see how HUD’s own nondiscrimination by itself could 
significantly ‘further’ the ending of such discrimination.” (emphasis added)). 
 101. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 102. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208, 211 (1972) (quoting Sen. 
Mondale). 
 103. Id. at 211 (quoting Sen. Jarvis). 
 104. See id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. See Glendale Neighborhood Ass’n v. Greensboro Hous. Auth., 901 F. Supp. 996, 
1009 (M.D. N.C. 1995) (holding that HUD’s failure to follow site selection regulations is a 
violation of AFFH duty resulting in HUD’s liability). 
 106. Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1536–37 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting 
that HUD can be held liable where HUD knows of a downstream failure but continues to 
fund the noncompliant grantee). 
 107. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).   
 108. Id. at 822. 
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racial minorities.109  More recently, in Thompson v. U.S. Department of 
Housing & Urban Development,110 the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Maryland applied this principle to the entire city of Baltimore, which was 
heavily segregated and found that HUD had insufficiently considered 
“public housing opportunities beyond the City limits” of Baltimore.111  The 
court focused the inquiry on whether the efforts were effective in 
“disestablishing segregation.”112  Locating housing projects within 
Baltimore, an area that was heavily concentrated with a nonwhite 
population, did not fulfill HUD’s duty to “affirmatively further” fair 
housing.113 
The second theory by which HUD can be held liable under § 3608(e)(5) 
is a situation in which HUD is “aware” of a grantee’s noncompliance with 
the Act and fails to terminate its funding.114  In Anderson v. City of 
Alpharetta,115 the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that HUD should be held 
liable for failing to prevent the municipal housing authority from acting in 
contravention of the AFFH requirement prior to HUD approval of the 
housing projects.116  The court held that to hold HUD responsible in this 
failure to monitor-type claim HUD must be:  (1) aware of the violation and 
(2) currently providing federal funds to the grantee.117 
 
 109. Id. at 816. In response to Shannon, HUD developed site selection regulations that 
would ensure compliance with both the substantive and procedural requirements of the 
Shannon decision. See discussion infra Part I.C.1–2 (detailing the components of the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) fund-granting mechanism such as the 
Consolidated Plan, various certifications of the grantee, and Analysis of Impediments). 
 110. 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 450 (D. Md. 2005). 
 111. Id. at 450 (D. Md. 2005); id. at 408 (“The Court finds . . . that Plaintiffs have proven 
a statutory claim . . . with respect to HUD, and its failure adequately to consider a regional 
approach to desegregation of public housing . . . .”). 
 112. Id. at 448.  The court concluded that HUD defines the area in which it is appropriate 
to analyze potential remedial efforts as the “housing market area.” Id.  The “housing market 
area” in turn is defined by a Metropolitan Statistical Area that includes the area within 
Baltimore City limits as well as surrounding municipalities. Id. at 503.  The racial 
composition of the Baltimore City area was found to be sixty-four percent African American 
compared to the twenty-eight percent within the Metropolitan Statistical Area. Id.  With 
knowledge of these facts, HUD located eighty-nine percent of the Metropolitan Statistical 
Area’s public housing within the City of Baltimore. Id.  “As a result, Baltimore City has 
become a ‘regional magnet’ for families unable to afford housing . . . .” Id. at 504. 
 113. Id. at 508; see Shannon, 436 F.2d at 811–14 (holding HUD liable for approving 
federal assistance for a public housing project without considering its effect:  to force it into 
compliance with the Act by cutting off existing federal financial assistance). 
 114. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1984); Client’s 
Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406 (8th Cir. 1983); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th 
Cir. 1971). 
 115. 737 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 116. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d at 1534–35. 
 117. Id. at 1537 (explaining that policy considerations support the rule of holding HUD 
liable for knowingly funding noncompliant grantees:  “the termination of federal funds is 
virtually the only weapon available to HUD in its efforts to enforce” the FHA). 
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 b.  Application of § 3608(e)(5) to Grantees 
In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,118 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit was confronted with a situation in which the 
New York City Housing Authority (the Authority) decided that white 
residents were needed in a federally funded housing project to prevent the 
racial composition from reaching a “tipping point” that would have caused 
the project’s racial composition to spiral to a completely segregated and all 
non-white state.119 
The court found constitutional and statutory sources for the Authority’s 
obligation to “act affirmatively to achieve integration” and then approved 
the Authority’s strategy.120  The Equal Protection Clause prohibits housing 
authorities from implementing a tenant assignment policy that assigns a 
tenant of a given race to an area for the very reason that the area is highly 
concentrated with the tenant’s race.121  The court turned to § 3608(e)(5) of 
the Act for the Authority’s statutory obligation:  “[a]ction must be taken to 
fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential housing 
patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation.”122  Section 3608(e)(5) 
clearly states that the AFFH duty applies to the Secretary of HUD but the 
Otero court held that this duty also applies to “other agencies administering 
federally-assisted housing programs.”123  Even after HUD transfers federal 
funds to the Authority, the statutory obligation to “affirmatively further” 
fair housing remains.124 
3.  Direct Challenge of AFFH Violations is Not Available 
The enforcement provisions of the FHA provide three methods of 
enforcement:  (1) suits by the Attorney General,125 (2) administrative 
complaints to HUD,126 and (3) court actions brought by private plaintiffs.127  
Provisions of the Act significantly limit the scope of each of the three 
 
 118. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 119. Id. at 1122–30. 
 120. Id. at 1133. 
 121. Id. (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969)) 
(implying that the exclusion of the strategy overruled in Gautreaux indirectly channels a 
housing authority’s efforts toward integration by channeling racial minorities to low 
concentration areas). 
 122. Id. at 1134. 
 123. Id.; see also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 73 (D. Mass. 
2002) (extending the AFFH duty to a local housing authority). 
When viewed in the larger context of [the FHA], the legislative history, and the 
case law, there is no way—at least, none that makes sense—to construe the 
boundary of the duty to affirmatively further fair housing as ending with the 
Secretary . . . [t]hese regulations unambiguously impose mandatory requirements 
on the [public housing authorities] not only to certify their compliance . . . but 
actually to comply. 
Id. at 73, 75. 
 124. See Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134. 
 125. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (2006). 
 126. See id. § 3612. 
 127. See id. § 3613. 
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methods of enforcement.128  Suits by the Attorney General are only allowed 
when the defendant engages in a “pattern or practice” of discrimination, or 
when the discrimination raises “an issue of general public importance.”129 
The FHA enforcement scheme unsurprisingly aligns with the central 
focus of the Act:  the prohibition of discrimination in housing markets.130  
Notably, there is not a statutory provision that provides direct enforcement 
of § 3608(e)(5).131  The enforcement mechanism that does exist is 
derivative.132  In NAACP,133 for example, the First Circuit held that the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)134 allows federal courts to review 
claims that the Secretary of HUD is not affirmatively furthering the 
purposes of the FHA.135  The APA creates a presumption that final agency 
action and determinations of whether the agency action conforms with 
statutory obligations are judicially reviewable.136  Therefore, any final 
agency action on the part of HUD, including approving the location of a 
housing project or providing funds to a grantee, is reviewable under the 
APA and § 3608(e)(5)’s AFFH obligations.137 
 
 128. Eugene R. Gaetke & Robert G. Schwemm, Government Lawyers and Their Private 
“Clients” Under the Fair Housing Act, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 331–33 (1997). 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 3613.  This restriction positions the Attorney General as a “minimal” 
participant in the FHA enforcement scheme. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 
205, 211 (1972).  This minimal level of participation is evidenced by the fact that “in the 
seven years that preceded enactment of the [FHA], the Justice Department brought an 
average of only ten fair housing cases per year.” Gaetke & Schwemm, supra note 128, at 
332. 
 130. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (defining “discriminatory housing practice” as “an act that is 
unlawful” under § 3604 (discrimination in the sale or rental of housing), § 3605 
(discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions), § 3606 (discrimination in the 
provision of brokerage services), or § 3617 (interference, coercion, or intimidation); but not 
including failure to comply with § 3608(e)(5) as a “discriminatory housing practice”); Nat’l 
Comm’n of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Pub. Hearing at 4  (Sept. 22, 2008) (testimony 
of Michael Allen) (noting that the narrow definition of “discriminatory housing practice” in 
42 U.S.C. § 3602 does not include “a failure to comply with the obligations of § 3608(e)(5)” 
and therefore prevents the AFFH obligation from being enforceable by private parties such 
as fair housing and community groups). 
 131. Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and 3604(c):  A New Look 
at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 195 n.24 
(2001)  (“Claims based on § 3608 . . . are not covered by the FHA’s enforcement provisions 
and therefore must be brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
 132. See supra Introduction (describing the Anti-Discrimination Center action). 
 133. 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 134. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706. 
 135. NAACP, 817 F.2d at 151 (rejecting the district court’s finding that it could not 
legally review the claim the court wrote, “We believe . . . that the court has the power to 
review appellant’s claim that the Secretary has not ‘administer[ed]’ certain HUD programs 
‘in a manner affirmatively to further’ the Act’s basic policy”). 
 136. Id. at 152 (“This ‘presumption’ of judicial reviewability, now codified in the 
[Administrative Procedure Act] applies not only to ‘[a]gency action made reviewable by 
statute,’ but also to any other ‘final agency action for which there is no other adequate 
remedy in a court . . . .’”). 
 137. See id. at 157. 
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The standard of review under the APA is extraordinarily deferential to 
HUD.138  For example, HUD’s decision to approve a subsidized housing 
project will be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”139  The duty is 
“essentially procedural.”140  So long as HUD adheres to the “procedural” 
requirements of the Act and, in the case of housing project site selection, as 
long as HUD at least considers the relevant racial and environmental 
factors, the duty is met.141  Furthermore, unlike the enforcement options 
available to individuals alleging discrimination under the FHA, aggrieved 
persons alleging § 3608(e)(5) violations cannot bring actions against HUD 
grantees.142  The FHA’s reliance on HUD to enforce the grantee’s AFFH 
duties implicates HUD’s granting mechanism.  In the next section this Note 
focuses on the fund granting mechanism used in the Community 
 
 138. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  The U.S. Supreme Court applied the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402 (1971).  Commenting on how narrow the inquiry is, the Court stated: 
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment . . . .  Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, 
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.  The court is not empowered to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 
Id. at 416. 
 139. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also Darst-Webbe Tenant 
Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 710, 712–13 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
“that HUD cannot be forced to require the City to comply with the certifications it made,” 
but rejecting the district court’s view that (1) the court has “little authority to direct an 
agency on exactly what to do, exactly how to do it, and exactly how to fund it,” and (2) 
HUD’s subjective belief that it “has taken all necessary steps to further fair housing” is 
enough to fulfill its AFFH duty); Alschuler v. HUD, 686 F.2d 472, 485 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that HUD’s analysis of the impact of a proposed project on the racial composition 
of the community was not “arbitrary and capricious” because HUD did not rely on a 
“materially distorted picture of the racial and economic balance of the relevant area”); Bus. 
Ass’n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 875 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that “[h]ousing 
decisions . . . require a subtle assessment of past and future housing trends” and the decision 
of whether or not to characterize the population of a proposed project as part of one 
neighborhood or the other in analyzing the impact on racial composition of the area is 
“clearly a judgment within the purview of informed administrative discretion”); S.E. Chi. 
Comm’n v. HUD, 488 F.2d 1119, 1131 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that an extensive 
memorandum supporting HUD’s strategy to integrate a community will not be found to be 
“arbitrary and capricious” decision made solely on the grounds that the strategy “bore some 
risk of failure”). 
 140. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978) (holding that once an agency meets procedural requirements, the court cannot 
interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive). Cf. Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t. of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 421 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that while HUD 
analyzed the racial impact of housing projects the Department too narrowly circumscribed 
the potential solutions to the high nonwhite concentrations in Baltimore City).  
 141. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION DATABASE 
§ 21:3 (2009). 
 142. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(1) (stating that the Administrative 
Procedures Act only applies to federal agencies). 
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Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, which is similar to the 
mechanisms used in each of HUD’s fund granting programs.143 
C.  Dispersal of HUD Funds 
The dispersal of HUD funds is central to Anti-Discrimination-type 
actions.  The FCA action is based on the complicated fund-granting 
mechanism and the requirement the grantees conduct an Analysis of 
Impediments that complies with HUD guidelines.  The next section address 
this fund-granting mechanism. 
1.  Community Development Block Grants 
The CDBG program, representing about ten percent and $3.9 billion of 
HUD’s annual budget,144 is designed as a flexible fund-granting mechanism 
that enables state and local governments to channel funds toward a number 
of eligible community development needs.145  This flexibility is apparent 
when the range of projects and activities funded by CDBGs are examined.  
The most basic way CDBGs are used is to finance public facilities and 
improvements.146  The funds also allow community-based organizations to 
deliver public services such as child day-care, adult literacy programs and 
assistance for the homeless.147  A third category of CDBG fund use is 
economic development aimed at creating jobs for low or medium income 
persons.148  While eligible uses are varied, HUD has developed specific 
procedures for granting funds and monitoring their implementation.  Many 
of these procedures are designed to ensure that HUD and the grantees are in 
compliance with the FHA and CDBG regulations. 
 
 143. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED 
PLAN AND PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION REPORT SUBMISSIONS FOR LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 
1 (2009), http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/conplan/toolsandguidance/guidance/pdf/
local_guidelines_09-11.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR 
PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN] (listing the CDBG, HOME Investment Partnerships 
(HOME), Emergency Shelter Grant (ESG), and Housing Opportunities for Persons with 
AIDS (HOPWA) as four formula programs that use the Consolidated Plan to allocate funds). 
 144. HUD’S FY 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 3 (showing the 2009 CDBG 
program expenditure to be $3.9 billion). 
 145. See Top to Bottom Review of the Three-Decades-Old Community Development Block 
Grant Program:  Is the CDBG Program Still Targeting the Needs of Our Communities?:  
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Federalism and the Census, 109th Cong. 7–8 (2005) 
(statement of Roy A. Bernardi, Deputy Secretary, HUD) (“The CDBG program is the 
Federal Government’s largest single grant program to assist local jurisdictions in 
undertaking a variety of community development activities targeted to improving the lives of 
low and moderate-income Americans.”); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CDBG 
FORMULA TARGETING TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT NEED iii (2005) [hereinafter CDBG 
FORMULA] (describing the primary objectives of the CDBG program); Community 
Development Block Grant Program, HUD, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/
communitydevelopment/programs/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (describing the CDBG 
program as a “flexible” funding source). 
 146. See GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN, supra note 143, at 6. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 5. 
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State and local governments apply for CBGD funding by completing a 
Consolidated Plan.149  The Consolidated Plan is an opportunity for the local 
jurisdiction to establish a “unified vision for community development 
actions” and provide evidence to HUD of the community’s compliance with 
various regulations, including the FHA’s AFFH requirement.150  The 
Consolidated Plan requires communities to conduct an Analysis of 
Impediments (AI)—a comprehensive study of various impediments to fair 
housing—and to certify that the jurisdiction’s plans for the CDBG funds are 
compliant with the grantee’s AFFH duty.151  The Consolidated Plan 
requirement and accompanying certification process is the key element of 
HUD’s AFFH enforcement scheme.  If the community fails to submit the 
Plan or certify AFFH compliance, the jurisdiction will not receive federal 
funds.152 
HUD prioritizes all state and local government CDBG requests using the 
CDBG Formula.153  The formula incorporates the elements of community 
development listed in the CDBG statute, 42 U.S.C. § 5301, such as poverty, 
neighborhood blight, deteriorated housing, physical and economic distress, 
and isolation of income groups.154  The formula aims to identify areas 
where the community development needs are greatest.155 
 
 149. 24 C.F.R. § 91.2(a)(1) (2009) (listing the Consolidated Plan regulatory 
requirements); GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN, supra note 143, at 1 
(describing the Consolidated Plan as a “means to meet the submission requirements” for the 
CDBG program). 
 150. GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CONSOLIDATED PLAN, supra note 143, at 1. 
 151. Id. at 25–26. 
 152. FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at i (describing the consolidated plan 
and the certification that communities will affirmatively further fair housing as “a condition 
of receiving Federal funds”). 
 153. CDBG FORMULA, supra note 145, at 1–3 (providing an introduction to HUD’s use of 
the CDBG formula). 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2006) (listing the community development objectives of the 
CDBG program). 
 155. CDBG FORMULA, supra note 145, at iii (explaining that Congress designed the 
formula to “provide larger grants to communities with relatively high community 
development need and smaller grants to communities with relatively low community 
development need”).  The CDBG funds are divided into two pools:  70% is allocated to 
entitlement communities (defined as eligible metropolitan cities and counties) and 30% is 
allocated to states to serve non-entitled communities. Id. at vii.  Two formulas are used to 
rate each recipient category.  Formula A takes into account a given community’s 
metropolitan share of population (weighted at 25%); poverty (weighted at 50%); and 
overcrowding (weighted at 25%). Id. at vii, viii.  Formula B takes into account a given 
community’s growth lag or the difference between the community’s actual growth and the 
growth it would have had if it grew as an average community did since 1960 (weighted at 
20%); the community’s share of metropolitan area poverty (weighted at 30%); and the 
community’s share of pre-1940 housing (weighted at 50%). Id. at vii–viii.  The community’s 
CDBG “need” is calculated by taking the higher (i.e. the score that would allocate more 
funds to the community) of the two scores and allocating based on that score. Id.  The 
effectiveness of the CDBG formula in quantifying “need” in a way that does justice to the 
legislative intent of § 5301 has been questioned. Id. at 96 (concluding that “serious 
consideration should be given to changing the formula to improve its targeting [of 
community] need”). 
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2.  Analysis of Impediments 
The AI component of the Consolidated Plan and AFFH certification 
requires that grantees certify that they “will conduct an analysis to identify 
impediments to fair housing choice within the area, take appropriate actions 
to overcome the effects of any impediments . . . and maintain records 
reflecting the analysis.”156  This requirement aligns the CDBG fund-
granting mechanism with the federal court’s interpretation of HUD’s AFFH 
duty.157  HUD has a duty to analyze the impact a housing project might 
have on the racial concentration of minorities in the community.158  The 
AFFH language requires HUD to use its grant programs to move towards 
an ideal of “genuinely open housing.”159  The AI requirement calls on the 
grantees, with intimate knowledge of their community, to detail all the 
impediments that have so far prevented the community from achieving 
“genuinely open housing.”160 
HUD defines AI as a “review of impediments to fair housing choice in 
the public and private sector.”161  “Impediments” are further defined as 
“any actions, omissions, or decisions taken because of race, color, religion, 
sex, disability, familial status, or national origin that restrict housing 
choices or the availability of housing choices.”162  HUD’s regulations 
mandate that the AI be completed, kept on record and that the grantee 
certify the AI has been completed, but rarely audits the grantee’s AI to 
ensure that it sufficiently analyzed impediments.163  Thus, grantees expend 
varying degrees of effort in fulfilling the AI requirement. 
3.  HUD Enforcement of § 3608(e)(5) 
Numerous enforcement provisions of the FHA allow aggrieved parties to 
bring direct suits against those who intentionally discriminate in the 
housing markets.164  The FHA’s AFFH duties lack a similar enforcement 
provision:  parties must rely on derivative actions.165  HUD’s AFFH duties 
can be enforced through the APA, but the extremely deferential “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard of review limits many potential causes of action 
 
 156. 24 C.F.R. § 91.425 (a)(1)(i) (2010); see also id. § 570.601(a)(2). 
 157. CDBG FORMULA, supra note 145, at 5. 
 158. See Alschuler v. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 482 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that HUD and HUD grantees have a duty to consider racial impediments to fair 
housing). 
 159. 114 CONG. REC. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke) (stating that the FHA 
reflects a “desire to have HUD use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and 
segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases.”) 
 160. Id. 
 161. FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at 4-4.  
 162. Id. 
 163. See CITY OF OAKLAND, CMTY. & ECON. DEV. AGENCY, FAIR HOUSING PLANNING:  
ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING 49–63 (2005) (detailing the racially segregated 
housing patterns in the City of Oakland). 
 164. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (providing for private 
enforcement of prohibitions against “discriminatory housing practices”). 
 165. See supra Part I.B. 
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against HUD.166  Municipal or state violation of AFFH duties can 
theoretically be challenged through a § 1983 action, but some courts are 
becoming reluctant to entertain claims based on § 3608(e)(5) against state 
or local government entities.167  In light of these restrictions, enforcement 
of AFFH violations is left in the hands of HUD.168 
Advocacy groups have noted that HUD has not “developed the 
enforcement tools or the political will to take on the powerful constituent 
groups, like mayors, governors and county executives who are the primary 
recipients of CDBG” funds.169  The argument is that HUD, and its office of 
Community Planning and Development which oversees the CDBG 
program, views these elected officials as “[their] chief constituents.”170  
There is not any data available that would definitively prove that HUD is 
ineffective in enforcing the AFFH obligations of its grantees.171  However, 
there is sufficient evidence that levels of segregation have only dissipated 
moderately since the enactment of the FHA in 1968.172  There is also 
anecdotal evidence of HUD’s inability to effectively enforce the AFFH 
obligation.  For example, consider HUD’s inaction with respect to 
Westchester during a seven-year false claims period.  At a recent housing 
policy conference a “long-time HUD employee said he could think of only 
three instances over 20 years in which HUD” terminated CDBG funding for 
failure to comply with the AFFH duty.173 
D. The False Claims Act and Qui Tam Actions 
The FHA enforcement scheme was developed to complement the main 
thrust of the FHA:  prohibition of discrimination.  The AFFH requirement is 
the only desegregation provision in the Act and can only be enforced 
derivatively.  HUD’s AFFH duties can be enforced through the APA, but 
the extremely deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review 
limits many potential causes of action against HUD.  These deficiencies in 
the FHA enforcement scheme motivated the Center to bring a qui tam 
action under the FCA.  Part I.D.1 introduces the FCA and the legislative 
purpose behind the qui tam provision.  Part I.D.2 connects the qui tam 
provisions to AFFH enforcement and explores a circuit split over whether 
Analysis of Impediments reports can be used as the basis for qui tam 
actions. 
 
 166. See supra Part I.B. 
 167. NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR 
HOUSING 61 (2008) (making the case for a direct cause of action to enforce AFFH duties). 
 168. See supra note 106 (noting that HUD can be held liable if it knowingly funds a 
noncompliant grantee). 
 169. Allen, supra note 14, at 2. 
 170. Id. at 3. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See infra note 244 (noting the level of segregation present in Westchester). 
 173. Nat’l Comm’n of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Pub. Hearing at 4  (Sept. 22, 
2008) (testimony of Michael Allen). 
2010] PROMOTING RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION 1393 
1.  Historical Background of the False Claims Act 
The first iteration of the FCA was signed into law by President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1863.174  Congress hoped to reduce fraud on the part of military 
suppliers during the Civil War by creating a statutory right of recovery for 
fraudulent claims against the government.175  The innovative mechanism 
used by Congress was a qui tam provision that allowed any individual176 
(known as the relator) to file a claim on behalf of the government and reap 
fifty percent of a recovery amount.177  Recognizing the difficulty in 
maintaining perfect oversight in the administration of large federal 
government operations, the FCA took advantage of:  (1) the knowledge of 
private individuals to detect fraud178 and (2) the resources of the private 
citizen to bring the fraud in front of the court and follow it through until 
judgment.179  “Lincoln’s law,” as the FCA was known to many, would 
prove to be only a temporary solution:  it was heavy on the incentives, but 
light on a nuanced approach to balancing the incentives with limitations to 
counter parasitic action on the part of qui tam relators.180  Two phases of 
amendments have honed “Lincoln’s law” into the modern FCA, which will 
be briefly discussed below.181 
After years of relatively low government spending, the FCA emerged 
during the New Deal as a tool to prevent fraud in large-scale public works 
projects.182  Soon after its reemergence, the FCA failed to serve its purpose 
when the Supreme Court, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,183 upheld 
a parasitic claim based solely on an indictment previously filed by the 
government.184  This type of action was antithetical to the purposes of the 
 
 174. Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696–699 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2006)). 
 175. United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Global Capital Mkts., Inc., 377 F.3d 145, 151 
(2d Cir. 2004) (“Congress enacted the [FCA] in 1863 with the principal goal of stopping the 
massive frauds perpetrated by large private contractors during the Civil War.’” (quoting Vt. 
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000))). 
 176. The constitutionality of qui tam standing has been a topic of frequent scholarly 
discussion. See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of 
Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 544 (2000) (noting the constitutional debate). 
 177. Lissack, 377 F.3d at 151. 
 178. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 (1943) (“[O]ne of the 
chief purposes of the Act . . .  was to stimulate action . . . and large rewards were offered to 
stimulate actions by private parties.”). 
 179. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act:  A Civil War 
Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458 (1998). 
 180. Gary W. Thompson, A Critical Analysis of Restrictive Interpretation Under the 
False Claims Act’s Public Disclosure Bar:  Reopening the Qui Tam Door, 27 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 669, 672–73 (1998). 
 181. See Meador & Warren, supra note 179, at 459–60 (noting that Congress amended 
the FCA once in 1943 and a second time in 1986). 
 182. See id. at 459. 
 183. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
 184. See id. at 542 (“We think the conduct of these respondents comes well within the 
prohibition of the statute, which includes ‘every person who . . . causes to be presented, for 
payment . . . any claim upon or against the Government of the United States . . . knowing 
such claim to be . . . fraudulent” (quoting Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696–99 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006))). 
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Act because the private party did not expose information concerning a 
fraudulent claim, instead the party simply beat the government to the 
courthouse when the Department of Justice was already en route.185  This 
type of claim is parasitic in the sense that the party bringing the claim 
attempts to siphon off a percentage of the government’s claim without 
benefiting the government.186  Congress reacted quickly to the apparent 
flaw in the functioning of President Lincoln’s FCA and in 1943 amended 
the FCA to include a provision only allowing qui tam actions “based upon 
information, evidence and sources not in the possession . . . of the United 
States.”187   
In the years following the adoption of the 1943 FCA amendment, it 
became clear that the bar on information “in the possession of the United 
States” went too far.188  It prevented private citizens from bringing a very 
useful set of actions in which the relator, through a qui tam suit, shows the 
government that information already in government hands amounts to fraud 
when the government otherwise would not have come to this conclusion.189  
The other problem created by the restriction was that it was very difficult 
for the private citizen to determine whether or not the information was “in 
the possession of the United States” prior to initiation of the suit.190 
The pendulum of restrictions on qui tam actions swung back in 1986 and 
settled somewhere between the liberal provisions of “Lincoln’s law” and 
the restrictive 1943 amendments.191  The 1986 amendments repositioned 
Congress’s attempt to block parasitic qui tam actions by shifting focus from 
whether the government was “in possession” of the information to whether 
the act was based upon information that was publicly disclosed.192  
Accordingly, the 1986 amendments added the following language to the 
FCA: 
 No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based 
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, 
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or 
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investigation, or 
from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General 
 
 185. See Marcus, 317 U.S. at 537. 
 186. Thompson, supra note 180, at 697. 
 187. Id. at 676. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Act of December 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2006)). 
 190. See James Roy Moncus III, Note, The Marriage of the False Claims Act and the 
Freedom of Information Act:  Parasitic Potential or Positive Synergy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1549, 1556 (2002). 
 191. United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 
1991) (noting that the intent of the 1986 amendments to the FCA was to “have the qui tam 
suit provision operate somewhere between the almost unrestrained permissiveness 
represented by the Marcus decision . . . and the restrictiveness of the post-1943 cases, which 
precluded suit even by original sources”). 
 192. See id. 
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or the person bringing the action is an original source of the 
information.193 
This provision, referred to as the FCA’s public disclosure bar, more 
accurately pinpoints the parasitic Marcus-type action that Congress 
intended to discourage with the 1943 Amendments to the FCA.194  What 
constitutes “public disclosure,” and each of the enumerated forms of public 
disclosure such as “administrative report,” has been contested. 
The FCA imposes liability on any person who “knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”195  
The FCA further defines “knowingly” as when a person “(1) has actual 
knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth 
or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or 
falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is 
required.”196  Thus, the FCA requires mere “reckless disregard of the truth 
or falsity of the information” rather than the more stringent intent 
requirement of common law fraud.197 
Qui tam actions are derivative in nature—the qui tam relator is suing on 
behalf of the government—and the procedural requirements of the FCA 
reflect a desire to balance the right of the U.S. Government to sue on the 
government’s behalf with the right of the relator to bring information 
exposing fraud forward, initiate the action, and claim a portion of the 
recovery.198  Under the qui tam provision of the FCA, “[a] person may 
 
 193. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 194. See Moncus, supra note 190, at 1556–57 (describing the modern public disclosure 
bar). 
 195. 31 U.S.C § 3729(a)(1). 
 196. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). 
 197. See Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 
(9th Cir. 1982) (“The [FCA’s] scienter requirement is something less than that set out in the 
common law, where the words ‘to defraud’ commonly refer to wronging one in his property 
rights by dishonest methods or schemes, and usually signify the deprivation of something of 
value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 198. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (stating that suits are brought in the name of the government); 
Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV 543, 571 (1990) (describing the standing of qui tam relators as 
“derivative” and questioning the ability of qui tam relators to satisfy Article III standing 
requirements).  The procedural requirements of a qui tam suit are, in many ways, analogous 
to the more common shareholder derivative suit.  In shareholder derivative suits, the 
shareholder attempts to sue officers and directors of the corporation on behalf of the 
corporation itself. See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in 
Derivative Litigation:  The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1993) 
(describing shareholder derivative suits as permitting shareholders to sue “derivatively on 
their corporation’s behalf”).  The challenge for the courts is to balance the shareholder’s 
right to sue with the board’s right to manage the corporation—after all, the suit is being 
brought on behalf of the corporation. Id. (noting the conflict between permitting shareholders 
to champion their corporation’s rights and the right of corporations to resolve internal 
conflicts without court intervention).  Courts, namely the Delaware Chancery Court, have 
developed procedural rules that force the shareholder to either make a demand to the board 
of directors to bring the suit themselves or prove that such demand would be futile. See id. at 
1343–53 (describing the shareholder demand requirement and the futility exception).  The 
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bring a civil action for a violation of [the FCA] for the person and for the 
United States Government.”199  “The action shall be brought in the name of 
the government.”200  The FCA gives the United States the option to “either 
intervene and prosecute the action, or allow the original plaintiff—the qui 
tam relator—to proceed with the suit.”201  The government has sixty days to 
investigate the matter and decide whether or not to intervene.202  Even 
when the government opts not to intervene, the government retains an 
option to intervene at a later date.203 Whether or not the government 
intervenes, “the relator is entitled to a portion of the proceeds if the 
prosecution is successful.”204 
2.  Interaction Between the Public Disclosure Bar and Freedom of 
Information Requests for Analysis of Impediments 
As Parts I.B and I.C demonstrated, the AFFH duty imposed on HUD 
grantees is intimately connected to the grantee’s obligation to analyze 
impediments of fair housing.  In Anti-Discrimination Center, for example, 
Westchester’s failure to analyze racial impediments was used as the basis 
for liability.205  As was recognized in Part I.C.2, HUD relies on the 
grantee’s certification that a proper analysis was conducted and does not 
take possession of or audit the report.206  One difficulty that relators, such 
as the Center, run into in bringing an Anti-Discrimination Center-type 
action is gaining access to the grantee’s AI report.  The relator must gain 
access to the report to determine if the analysis was conducted properly, 
which often requires a state law freedom of information request such as the 
Center’s State of New York Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) 
 
demand requirement is similar to the FCA’s procedural requirements that allow the United 
States to intervene in qui tam actions if the government so desires. See 31 U.S.C 
§ 3730(b)(2). 
 199. 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(1). 
 200. Id. 
 201. United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 
1153 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the relationship between the relator and the government in 
qui tam actions). 
 202. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
 203. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(D)(3). In fact, the government used this second intervention 
provision in Anti-Discrimination Center to intervene more than three years after the Center 
filed the original compliant. See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y.  
v. Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that the United 
States had not yet intervened); United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., 
Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., No. 06-cv-02860-DLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009) (noting that the United States intervened). 
 204. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).  The amount the relator receives varies between fifteen and 
twenty-five percent of all damages awarded. See id. § 3730(d).  The damages awarded can 
be as much as three times the amount of the fraudulent claims. See id. § 3729(a) (stating that 
the false claimant is liable “for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than 
$10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages the Government sustains”). 
 205. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *3 (stating that contrary 
to Westchester’s duty to conduct an AI, including racial impediments, Westchester failed to 
do so). 
 206. See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text. 
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request.207  The nature of this critical piece of evidence, and the means by 
which private parties gain access to it, interact with the unique nature of a 
qui tam action.  The qui tam provisions of the FCA attempt to encourage 
private parties to ferret out fraud against the government while 
disincentivizing parasitic Marcus-type actions.208  The public disclosure bar 
is the mechanism used to balance209 these competing interests and circuit 
courts are divided on the issue of how the bar relates to state and municipal 
government reports garnered through FOIL-type requests.210 
It is important to understand what issues are at play when the public 
disclosure bar is applied to state FOIL-type requests, as these same issues 
will be confronted by the next district court hearing an Anti-Discrimination 
Center-type action.  The application of the disclosure bar is a three-pronged 
analysis.  First, the court must determine whether the action is “based upon” 
a “public disclosure” of the wrongdoing.211  Second, the court determines 
 
 207. See supra notes 156–63 and accompanying text. 
 208. See United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(noting that the 1986 amendments to the FCA “attempt to strike a balance between 
encouraging private citizens to expose fraud and avoiding parasitic actions by opportunists 
who attempt to capitalize on public information without seriously contributing to the 
disclosure of the fraud”). 
 209. United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 740 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“[T]he 1986 amendments were an attempt to correct what Congress perceived as a 
century old imbalance between the under-deterrence of the original Act, which permitted 
‘parasitic’ qui tam actions to be brought by individuals with no independent knowledge of 
fraud, and the over-deterrence of the 1943 amendments which denied jurisdiction over all 
qui tam actions ‘based on evidence or information the government had when the action was 
brought.’” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded))). 
 210. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester 
Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that circuits are divided on the 
issue of whether state government reports, hearings, audits, and investigations are 
encompassed by the public disclosure bar of the FHA). Compare Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745 
(holding that the FCA’s public disclosure bar does not prohibit actions based on “non-federal 
government sources”), and United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 39 F. 
Supp. 2d 28, 31–33 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that an audit performed by an outside accounting 
firm for the federal government qualifies for the public disclosure bar), with United States ex 
rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that state agency audit 
reports constitute public disclosures and are barred by the public disclosure bar), and Hays v. 
Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the Dunleavy approach and 
concluding that compliance audits conducted by a state agency authorized to administer a 
cooperative federal/state program are “public disclosures”). 
 211. Although the determination of what amount of information is required to constitute 
“public disclosure” was not an important factor in Anti-Discrimination Center, it may be 
helpful to briefly explain the analysis.  Many cases refer to a passage in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit case of United States ex rel. Springfield 
Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The D.C. Circuit explained 
the leading theory on the issue as follows: 
[I]f X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of fraud and X and Y represent its 
essential elements.  In order to disclose the fraudulent transaction publicly, the 
combination of X and Y must be revealed, from which readers or listeners may 
infer Z, i.e., the conclusion that fraud has been committed. 
Id. at 654; see, also United States ex rel. Ondis v. City of Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49, 54 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (citing to, and following, the Springfield Terminal court’s description of the 
information required to constitute “public disclosure”).  To infer that fraud has been 
committed (Z), one needs knowledge of a misrepresented state of facts (X) and a true state of 
facts (Y).  Unless the court finds disclosures of both the X and Y variables the fraud cannot 
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whether the mode of disclosure is enumerated in the statute.212  In Anti-
Discrimination Center-type actions, the question is whether the wrongdoing 
was disclosed as an “allegation[] or transaction[]” in an “administrative, or 
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation.”213  
Third, if the court determines that the wrongdoing was publicly disclosed as 
an enumerated public disclosure, the relator must prove that she is the 
“original source” of the information.214 
Circuit courts unanimously agree that freedom of information requests 
constitute a “public disclosure” within the meaning of the FCA qui tam 
provisions.215  In a leading case, United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. 
Housing Authority of Pittsburgh,216 the Third Circuit considered whether an 
FCA action based upon letters sent to HUD and later obtained through a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request constituted “public disclosure” 
of the wrongdoing.217  The court explained that the central purpose of FOIA 
is “to ensure that government activities are opened to the sharp eye of 
public scrutiny.”218  Furthermore, the court noted that FOIA declares that 
“[e]ach agency shall make available to the public certain specified 
categories of information.”219  Citing to the Supreme Court’s view that 
disclosure pursuant to a FOIA request constituted public disclosure within 
the meaning of the Consumer Products Safety Act,220 the Mistick PBT court 
wrote “[w]e see no sound basis for construing ‘public disclosure’ any more 
narrowly” in the FCA context.221  Applying Mistick PBT to the Center’s 
New York State FOIL request, Judge Denise L. Cote reasoned that the AI 
report was “publically disclosed” and qualified for the first prong of the 
FCA’s public disclosure bar.222  A similar outcome is likely for the next 
Anti-Discrimination Center-type action. 
Unlike the first prong, there is considerable disagreement among circuit 
courts as to how to apply the second, mode of disclosure, prong to 
 
be considered publicly disclosed. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 741.  This analysis can be thought 
of as complementing the analysis required to determine whether an alleged disclosure is a 
“public disclosure”. See infra notes 220–27 and accompanying text. 
 212. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 213. Id. (emphasis added). 
 214. See id. (stating that the action is barred if disclosed by an enumerated mode of 
disclosure “unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the 
action is an original source of the information”). 
 215. Moncus, supra note 190, at 1581 (noting that the “courts of appeals have almost 
universally agreed,” but arguing that the logic of this interpretation is “incongruous with 
both the legislative and judicial history” of the FCA). 
 216. 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 217. Id. at 379 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining the factual background of the case). 
 218. Id. at 383 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 774 
(1989)). 
 219. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §552(a)) 
 220. Id. (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 
(1980)); see Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2084 (2006). 
 221. Mistick, 186 F.3d, at 383. 
 222. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester 
Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In sum, although the Center’s claim is 
based on publicly disclosed information obtained through a FOIL request, the information 
was not obtained from a source enumerated in the Section 3730(e)(4)(A) jurisdictional bar.”) 
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information garnered via a freedom of information request from a state or 
municipal agency.223  The conflict stems from ambiguity in the list used to 
enumerate modes of disclosure barred from FCA actions.224  The FCA fails 
to distinguish between a state and federal modes of disclosures and leaves 
the courts with the responsibility of determining whether an enumerated 
mode of disclosure references state or federal “administrative . . . report, 
hearing, audit, or investigation.”225  The ambiguity is magnified in Anti-
Discrimination Center-type actions in which the state report is arguably 
“connected significantly to federal regulations and funds.”226  Some circuit 
courts have argued that analysis of the modes of disclosure listed in 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), and specifically the words “congressional” and 
“Government Accounting Office,” are federal in nature and should lead to 
the inference that “federal” should also modify “administrative reports.”227  
Other courts rely more heavily on the purpose behind the public disclosure 
bar and view use of a state or municipal administrative report tied to a 
federal program to be more parasitic than beneficial.228  The disagreement 
among circuit courts is central to the viability of the qui tam action in 
enforcing AFFH obligations against HUD grantees because  if reports such 
as the AI report qualify for the public disclosure bar, the qui tam action will 
fail unless the relator can prove that she was an “original source.”229  Part 
II.A will explore this conflict in more detail.  
The third prong of the public disclosure bar is an exception to the general 
rule that public disclosure by way of an enumerated mode of disclosure is 
barred.230  If the relator is an “original source” of the public disclosure, the 
suit is not barred.231  The Act explicitly states that a relator is an “original 
source” if the relator (1) “has direct and independent knowledge of the 
information on which the allegations are based,” and (2) “has voluntarily 
provided the information to the Government before filing an action.”232  
Courts have interpreted “direct knowledge” to require a relator who bases 
her lawsuit on an enumerated public disclosure to have witnessed some 
aspect of the fraudulent activity—not simply to have collected the 
information from others.233  “Independent knowledge” has been interpreted 
 
 223. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 225. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 226. United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that state reports “connected significantly to federal regulations and funds” 
constitute “administrative reports” and therefore cannot be used in conjunction with FCA 
claims). 
 227. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir. 
1997) (applying the concept of noscitur a sociis or “a word is known by the company it 
keeps”). 
 228. See Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 918; United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 
982, 988-91 (8th Cir. 2003);  
 229. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(A). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
 233. Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 477, 502 (1995). 
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as a requirement that the relator have information “that was not derived 
from the public disclosure.”234  Finally, the requirement that the relator 
voluntarily provide the information to the government has been interpreted 
to bar a relator from capitalizing on a situation in which she has been 
compelled to reveal the information.235 
E.  Analyzing Anti-Discrimination Center as “Public Law” Litigation 
 
Part I.D discussed some of the practical concerns surrounding the use of 
qui tam to enforce AFFH obligations.  Part I.E analogizes the Center’s use 
of qui tam to the paradigm of “public law” litigation detailed in Professor 
Chayes’ piece The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation236 in hopes of 
finding a framework in which the viability of using qui tam to enforce a 
HUD grantee’s AFFH obligations can be measured.  The discussion briefly 
turns back to the particulars of Anti-Discrimination Center as additional 
context is provided for presentation of the dispute as a means of enforcing 
civil rights and facilitating structural change.  Part I.E.1 presents some of 
the issues relevant to achieving structural change within HUD.  Part I.E.2 
then goes on to explain why representation of the parties should not be 
taken for granted in “public law” litigation.  Part I.E.3 introduces the 
problem of positively impacting segregation—actually achieving the goals 
of the FHA.   
In Anti-Discrimination Center, the Center alleged that Westchester 
fraudulently asserted that it had conducted a sufficient AI, fulfilled its 
AFFH duty, and was in compliance with FHA.  Using this theory, the 
Center requested that Westchester repay all the CDBG237 funds received 
from HUD between the years 2000 and 2006.238 
Initially, Westchester officials wrote the claim off, calling it 
“garbage.”239  Westchester attempted to shift blame to the individual 
municipalities by asserting that it did not have power to influence the way 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 503. Although Judge Cote did not find it necessary to analyze the third prong 
of the public disclosure bar, the third prong may provide relators, such as the Center, a way 
around a disadvantageous ruling under prong two.  The Center arguably had direct and 
independent knowledge of where Westchester was channeling HUD funds, but it is unclear 
whether the court would require direct knowledge of the faulty AI report. See infra note 244 
(describing Westchester’s failure to build subsidized housing across all municipalities). 
 236. Chayes, supra note 23. 
 237. The CDBG program was created with the enactment of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5321 (2006).  The program is designed to be 
flexible by providing communities with resources to “address a wide range of unique 
community development needs.” Community Development Block Grant Program, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/.  The program provides 
funds to both local and state governments. Id.; see supra Part I.C.1 (describing the CDBG 
fund-granting mechanism in detail).  
 238. Complaint at 2, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-cv-2860-DLC) (claiming 
Westchester falsely represented compliance with the FHA and “improperly received more 
than $45 million in federal funds”). 
 239. Sam Roberts, Housing Accord in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A1. 
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funds were spent by each municipality.240  In papers filed before Judge 
Cote, Westchester moved to dismiss the claim.  Latching on to one side of a 
circuit split, Westchester argued that FCA actions cannot be “based upon” a 
municipal report garnered through New York’s FOIL request.241  On July 
13, 2007, Judge Cote sided with the Third Circuit, among other circuits, in 
approving the use of a municipal report obtained through a FOIL request 
and denying Westchester’s motion to dismiss.242  Upon completion of 
discovery, Judge Cote granted in part the Center’s motion for summary 
judgment, agreeing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the 
County submitted false certifications as to its AFFH compliance.243  Judge 
Cote found that during the seven-year false claims period, Westchester 
failed to consider race as an impediment to fair housing.  This failure was 
an affront to explicit requirements of HUD and was astounding considering 
Westchester’s highly segregated geographic distribution of race.  The 
failure to analyze race as an impediment resulted in Westchester placing 
nearly all of its housing units supported by CDBG funds within high 
minority concentration municipalities.244  In response to these findings, on 
 
 240. Fernanda Santos, Judge Faults Westchester County on Desegregation Efforts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A24 (“Westchester County officials contend that they have no legal 
authority to tell municipalities how to use their land.  They have said they found reasonably 
priced land where developers could build lower-cost homes and then recommended to 
villages and towns how many each of them should have . . . .”); see supra Part I.C.1 
(discussing the relationship between HUD grantees and individual municipalities). 
 241. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11, Anti-Discrimination Center, 495 F. Supp. 2d 
375 (arguing that the approach used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
which would disallow use of state or municipal reports garnered through a freedom of 
information requests in FCA actions, should be adopted by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York); see generally New York Freedom of Information Law, 
N.Y. Pub. Officers Law §§ 85–89 (McKinney 2008).  The New York FOIL is patterned after 
the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). Ralph J. Marino, The New 
York Freedom of Information Law, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 83 (1974).  FOIA generally 
provides that any person has the right to request access to federal agency records or 
information. Id.  FOIL picks up where FOIA leaves off and applies this general principal to 
State of New York agencies. See id.  
 242. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (holding that “a local government 
entity that certifies to the federal government that it will affirmatively further fair housing as 
a condition to its receipt of federal funds must consider the existence and impact of race 
discrimination on housing opportunities and choice in its jurisdiction”). 
 243. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester 
Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that Westchester fraudulently 
certified its actions since “there is simply no evidence that . . . the County[] . . . analyzed 
race-based impediments to fair housing”). 
 244. Plaintiff’s Initial Expert Report of Andrew Beveridge at 16, Anti-Discrimination 
Ctr., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (describing the allocation of CDBG sponsored housing units in 
Westchester).  During a ten-year period beginning in 1990, Westchester allocated 5000 
housing units to be built but only 1639 of the allocated units were actually built. Id. at 13.  In 
addition, there were 670 units built beyond allocated number in six communities. Id.  The 
report observes: 
When one looks at the racial composition of these three groups (“over allocation 
jurisdictions,” “under allocation jurisdictions,” and “zero unit jurisdictions”), the 
differences are stark:  the “over allocation jurisdictions” were 24.2 percent non-
Hispanic black, and 46.8 percent non-Hispanic white; the “under allocation 
jurisdiction” were 11.5 percent non-Hispanic black and 65.9 percent non-Hispanic 
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August 10, 2009, Westchester tacitly recognized its weak bargaining 
position and agreed to spend $62.5 million to compensate HUD and the 
Center for the fraudulent assertions.245 
The settlement reached between the Center, the United States, and 
Westchester involved more than a simple transfer of the CDBG funds 
acquired through false claims.246  Westchester was facing upwards of a 
$180 million penalty when the treble damages provision of the FCA is 
taken into account; which gave the Center and the United States significant 
bargaining power.247  Westchester is “repaying” the government by 
building $50 million of affordable housing and locating the housing in those 
municipalities with the lowest concentrations of African Americans and 
Latinos.248  The settlement also includes a requirement that Westchester 
conduct a new AI to determine what impediments are impacting fair 
housing choice.249  The settlement specifically states that barriers such as 
“race” and “municipal resistance” must be examined.250  The court has 
appointed an independent monitor to ensure Westchester’s compliance with 
the settlement and has retained jurisdiction over the case.251 
The purpose of the Anti-Discrimination Center action and the settlement 
reached between the government, the Center and Westchester can be 
divided into three related components:  (1) affecting structural problems 
within HUD and Westchester, (2) providing sufficient representation of 
 
white; and the “zero unit jurisdictions” were 2.5 percent non-Hispanic black, and 
84.3 percent non-Hispanic white. 
Id. at 14. 
 245. Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at 37, Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 
668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (approving the settlement reached between the Center, the government, 
and the County). 
 246. See id. at 6 (“The County shall [construct at least 750 affordable housing units] 
solely through County funds, and not from any Federal, State, or other funding sources.”). 
 247. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C § 3729(a) (2006) (describing the liability for 
submitting false claims as “a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than 
$10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains”). 
 248. Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at 6–7, Anti-Discrimination 
Center, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (mandating that no less than 630 of the housing units must be 
located in municipalities with fewer than three percent African American and Latino 
populations). 
 249. Id. at 25 (“The County shall complete, within one hundred twenty calender days . . . 
an [AI] with the guidance in HUD’s Fair Housing Planning Guide . . . .”). 
 250. See id. at 24–25 (mandating that Westchester review racial and ethnic barriers to fair 
housing). 
 251. Id. at 11 (“The Government, in its sole discretion but with input from the County, 
shall select a monitor to be appointed by the Court . . . .”).  It should be noted that the Center 
is already displeased with the performance of the monitor. See Westchester Legislators Still 
Looking to Undercut Settlement Order, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CTR. (Nov. 30, 2009), 
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/news/westchester-legislators-still-looking-undercut-settlement-
order (noting displeasure over an apparent meeting between the Monitor and officials from 
Westchester County municipalities).  The Center quotes Westchester County Legislator 
Peter Harkham as stating “[i]t was an extremely positive exchange with Mr. Johnson where 
we had a frank discussion on implementation issues—especially the need for local workforce 
housing to get buy in from municipalities.” Id.  The Center disagrees with the idea of getting 
“buy in” from the municipalities when an order was issued. Id.  “A federal court order is not 
supposed to be some starting point in a continuing negotiation . . . .”  Id.  
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those negatively impacted by segregation, and (3) positively impacting the 
problem of segregation.  It is unclear whether Anti-Discirmination Center-
type actions achieve these purposes.  To assist in answering this question, 
this Note turns to the concept of “public law” litigation.   
Professor Chayes introduces the concept of “public law” litigation 
juxtaposing it against the traditional conception of adjudication.252  
Traditional litigation, or the “private law model,” “reflected the late 
nineteenth century vision of society, which assumed that the major social 
and economic arrangements would result from the activities of autonomous 
individuals.”253  The role of the courts was not to impose on the interaction 
of the autonomous individuals, but simply to oversee the interactions and 
enforce remedies only when one party is entrenched in “universal attitudes” 
or norms.254  One small step closer to the societal reach of “public law” 
litigation, traditional litigation clarified the law and shaped future behavior 
of similarly situated parties.255  The position of the trial judge was 
subjugated to the point of “passivity” on three fronts:  first, appellate courts 
were given heightened status in line with the idea that litigation was a way 
to clarify the law; second, because “the immediate impact of the judgment 
was confined to the parties”; and third, because there was a very limited 
conception of relief and a strong presumption for money damages.256 
The “public law model” cuts against many of the characteristics aligned 
with the traditional conception of adjudication. Gautreaux v. Chicago 
Housing Authority257 is a paradigmatic example of “public law” litigation in 
the context of housing segregation.258  The plaintiffs, African-American 
tenants of and applicants for public housing, sued the Chicago Housing 
Authority (CHA) and HUD on behalf of all similarly situated parties and 
challenged the constitutional validity of the site selection policy used by 
CHA.259  They claimed that CHA and HUD, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1983 and 1985,  “intentionally chose sites for family public housing and 
adopted tenant assignment procedures . . . for the purpose of maintaining 
existing patterns of residential separation of races in Chicago.”260  The U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed HUD as a 
defendant, but granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against 
 
 252. See Chayes, supra note 23, at 1285. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. (noting that even Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was viewed 
as “an outgrowth of the judicial duty to decide otherwise-existing private disputes”). 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. at 1286–87. 
 257. 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 258. Id. at 307–08 (describing the history of the litigation); see Gautreaux v. Chicago 
Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (finding CHA liable for intentional 
racial discrimination in public housing site selection); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 
304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (entering remedial order judgment), aff’d, Gautreaux, 
436 F.2d at 313; see also Schuck, supra note 66, at 319 (noting that Gautraux is one of only 
a few housing desegregation cases that has succeeded in moving a substantial number of 
blacks to previously white suburbs). 
 259. Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 908. 
 260. Id. 
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CHA in February of 1969.261  The court found that while CHA’s selection 
was not “necessarily motivated by racial animus,” “a deliberate policy to 
separate the races cannot be justified by the good intentions with which 
other laudable goals are pursued.”262  The court ordered that within twenty 
days the parties should formulate “a comprehensive plan to prohibit the 
future use and to remedy the past effects of CHA’s unconstitutional site 
selection and tenant assignment procedures.”263 
Five months after the court ordered summary judgment on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, having conferred with both the plaintiffs and CHA, the court 
issued a judgment order.264  The judgment required CHA to purchase and 
construct low-rise buildings and distribute them across all 
neighborhoods.265  The order also included a requirement that CHA assign 
tenants of all races throughout Chicago neighborhoods in hopes of allowing 
African Americans to move into predominately white neighborhoods.266  
The judgment was met with significant “political resistance [which] 
impeded the program’s implementation” and eighteen years after the initial 
judgment the court appointed a receiver to administer the order.267 
Although HUD was dismissed by the trial court in 1969, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that HUD was improperly 
dismissed as a defendant and was liable for the CHA-implemented site 
selection program.268  The court ordered that HUD fund a program aimed at 
opening up housing barriers and allowing inner-city African Americans to 
move into neighborhoods outside of the Chicago city limits.  HUD’s appeal 
to the Supreme Court was denied.  This marked the first time the Court 
upheld an interdistrict remedy in a segregation case.269 
 
 261. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1971) (granting Plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment), aff’d, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
 262. Gautreax, 296 F. Supp. at 914.  The CHA claimed that the ‘racial character of the 
neighborhood’ was never a factor in the selection of a suitable site. Id. at 914.  Furthermore, 
they claimed that so called “White sites” had been selected at the initial stage of site 
selection and the eventual selection of sites in highly concentrated African American 
neighborhoods reflected the officials intentions to further low cost housing in those 
neighborhoods and combat urban blight. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
 265. Id. at 738–39 (stipulating that not more than one-third of the housing units be located 
in the “General Public Housing Area of the City of Chicago,” defined as all areas with less 
than thirty percent non-white population). 
 266. See id. at 737–43. 
 267. Schuck, supra note 66, at 320 (discussing the history of the Gautreax litigation). 
 268. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1971).  Citing to Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 (1958), the court reasoned that HUD’s efforts to desegregate Chicago 
were equivalent to the local school board’s efforts in Aaron. Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 738.  
The school board in Aaron was held liable when it “abandoned [plans to desegregate the 
Little Rock, Arkansas schools] in the face of stiff community and state governmental 
resistance.” Id.  HUD was not absolved from liability because of similar “stiff community 
and state governmental resistance.” See id. at 739–40 (holding the HUD Secretary liable). 
 269. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299 (1976) (holding that “[t]he relevant 
geographic area for purposes of the respondents’ housing options is the Chicago housing 
market, not the Chicago city limits”). 
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In contrast to the “private law model,” the role of the trial court in 
“public law” litigation, as is evident throughout the Gautreaux litigation, is 
elevated.  The trial court does more than simply apply the law handed down 
by the appellate courts—it is the architect of a complicated remedial 
scheme.  The Gautreaux litigation featured private parties suing on behalf 
of not only themselves but everyone else similarly situated.270  The relief 
sought and received in Gautreaux did more than provide the plaintiffs and 
similarly situated parties with one-time compensation for past harms.271  
The Gautreaux litigation had the effect of restructuring the way CHA and 
HUD conduct housing programs.272  The benefits are theoretically available 
to not only the plaintiffs and similarly situated parties today, but to all 
similarly situated parties in the future. 
Professor Chayes acknowledged that the characteristics of “public law” 
litigation are far from static and that it is difficult to classify a given model 
in a bipolar public versus private dichotomy.  However, Professor Chayes 
developed a list of characteristics that are often present in “public law” 
litigation: 
(1)  The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped primarily by 
the court and parties. 
(2)  The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous. 
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive and 
legislative. 
(4)  Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form logically 
derived from the substantive liability and confined in its impact to the immediate 
parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly 
remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons including 
absentees. 
(5)  The remedy is not imposed but negotiated. 
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair:  its 
administration requires the continuing participation of the court. 
(7)  The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and statement of 
governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not only for credible fact 
evaluation but for organizing and shaping litigation to ensure a just and viable 
outcome. 
(8)  The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals 
about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.273 
It is not clear where Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions stand 
relative to Professor Chayes’ “public law” litigation paradigm.  The average 
action brought under the qui tam provisions of the FCA has many 
components that fit squarely within the “private law” model.  Putting aside 
the derivative component of qui tam, the action is very similar to common 
law fraud.274  The government is simply seeking redress for a wrong 
 
 270. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 271. See Schuck, supra note 66, at 319–21. 
 272. Id. at 321. 
 273. Chayes, supra note 23, at 1302. 
 274. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (comparing an action under the FCA to 
common law fraud). 
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committed in a private contractual dealing.275  The action has nothing to do 
with restructuring social institutions; in fact, it is the preeminent social 
institution itself, the federal government, seeking redress.276  Additionally, 
the redress sought is purely monetary:  the government seeks compensation 
from the fraudulent party in an amount three times more than the damage 
caused by the fraudulent act.277  The trial judge is subjugated to a role of 
applying the law handed down to her from the appellate courts:  she simply 
types the damages figure the jury comes up with into a calculator and 
multiplies by three. 
The Anti-Discrimination Center-type action is not the average action 
brought under the qui tam provisions of the FCA.278  Although the claim 
was brought under the pretext of a qui tam claim, the Center was only 
incidentally concerned with (1) being rewarded under relator compensation 
provisions of the FCA and (2) returning money to the government.279  The 
Center brought the action as a way of achieving redress for all citizens of 
Westchester—especially those who had not been given access to fair 
housing.280  The treble damages provisions of the FCA motivated 
Westchester to settle with the United States and the Center.281  This allowed 
the United States and the Center to negotiate a settlement that included 
strict requirements that Westchester comply with their AFFH duties.282  
Judge Cote was not relegated to applying law but was involved in 
approving the complex settlement.283  Depending on its success, the 
settlement could improve life for residents in Westchester.284  Furthermore, 
the suit brought by the Center had a governmental restructuring component 
and is likely to have effects on the way HUD and Westchester conduct their 
affairs.285 
It is clear that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions have many 
characteristics that fit within the “public law” litigation paradigm.  In order 
to determine how successful the Center’s action, and future Anti-
Discrimination Center-type actions, might be at improving conditions for 
Westchester residents, remedying the problem of residential segregation, 
and restructuring institutional players such as Westchester and HUD, this 
 
 275. See supra notes 5, 198 (explaining the basic components of a qui tam suit). 
 276. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (stating that qui tam actions are 
derivative in nature and the relator is suing on behalf of the government). 
 277. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (explaining the FCA’s treble damages 
provision). 
 278. See supra note 6 (describing a more typical qui tam action in which the government 
recovered money damages from individuals caught in a tax evasion scheme). 
 279. See Allen, supra note 14, at 3 (describing his firm’s action against Westchester as 
desegregation litigation). 
 280. See id. 
 281. See Joseph Berger, In Westchester, an Open Plea to Accept a Housing Accord, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/nyregion/
18spano.html (stating that members of the Westchester legislature “believed they had no 
choice because penalties for not approving it would amount to $180 million”). 
 282. See supra notes 246–51 (describing the settlement). 
 283. See supra notes 246–51 (describing the settlement). 
 284. See supra note 244 (describing segregated conditions prior to the settlement). 
 285. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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Note turns to some of the criticisms of the public law model and determines 
how Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions stand up to the criticism. 
1.  Solving Structural Problems Within HUD and Municipalities 
The settlement in Anti-Discrimination Center has elements of a structural 
remedy.286  Through the qui tam settlement, the United States and the 
Center have changed the relationship between Westchester and HUD.  
Arguably, the Anti-Discrimination Center action, along with the settlement, 
has changed the relationship between HUD and all CDBG grantees.  There 
has been much ink spilled on whether this type of judicial action is 
proper287 or whether judicial action in this area is effective at restructuring 
executive agencies and the like.288  Qui tam does not bring too much new to 
the table in terms of whether judicial action in this area is proper.  But as 
part of the discussion in Part II.B and III.B, we will examine the 
effectiveness of judicial action and determine whether some of the unique 
qualities of the qui tam suit have a positive or negative effect on the 
viability of the qui tam action to provide structural change in institutions.289 
 
 286. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1979) 
(defining a “structural suit” as “one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over 
values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a 
threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements”); Myriam Gilles, An 
Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction:  Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 143, 144 (2003) (identifying “structural reform injunctions” as injunctions that 
“enjoin[] the defendant institution from acting in a particular unconstitutional fashion [and] 
order[] forward-looking, affirmative steps to prevent future deprivations”). 
 287. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1307 (1978) (noting the 
separation of powers argument against judicial structural reform but concluding “it has 
always been hard to classify all government activity into three, and only three, neat and 
mutually exclusive categories”). 
 288. Compare FISS, supra note 287, at 90 (“The average judge turned out to be more 
heroic than the average legislator.”), with Gilles, supra note 286, at 146 n.16 (noting that 
extra-legal “discomfort with the role of the judge is most evident in legislation that aims to 
limit the ability of litigants to bring claims seeking structural relief”).  It could be argued that 
the failure of Congress to include a direct remedy for violations of AFFH duties reflected 
“discomfort” on the part of Congress that parties such as the Center would bring actions such 
as Anti-Discrimination Center. See supra Part I.B.3 (stating that there is no direct action 
available to enforce AFFH obligations). 
 289. After a flood of structural reform litigation following Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court has become increasingly hostile to structural reform 
and injunctions. See Gilles, supra note 286, at 145 (acknowledging a decrease in structural 
injunctions being brought).  This point is contrasted by a reality described by Professor 
Myriam Gilles of Cardozo School of Law, “There continue to exist sufficiently egregious, 
systemic constitutional issues that inspire (or could inspire) the requisite breadth of support 
and depth of reformist zeal to motor the machinery of the structural reform injunction.” Id.; 
see also Myriam Gilles, Representational Standing:  United States ex rel. Stevens and the 
Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 316 (2001) (noting that the decision 
“marks a radical reconfiguration of the landscape facing legislators seeking to vest private 
actors with standing to enforce federal laws”).  Professor Gilles would likely agree that this 
point also applies to statutory civil rights such as AFFH duties.  Thus, it could be argued that 
the Anti-Discrimination Center action acts as an expansion of the standing requirement, 
which allowed the Center to get around artificially strict standing rules. 
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2.  Representation of the Parties 
In an article entitled The Supreme Court 1978 Term,290 Yale Law School 
Professor Owen Fiss remarked, “[o]nce we take the group perspective on 
the victim, it also becomes clear that the spokesman need not—indeed 
cannot—be the victim.”291  Professor Fiss touches on a key point:  in public 
law litigation the party structure is “sprawling and amorphous”—the 
plaintiffs are those before the court, those similarly situated, and those who 
will be similarly situated in the future.292  Furthermore, an individual victim 
may not want to come forward, as they are in “such a vulnerable 
position.”293  There are problems of representation in “public law” litigation 
and Fiss remarks that “[a]s an affirmative matter this means that the court 
must determine whether the interests of the victim group are adequately 
represented.”294  This potential problem for public law must be examined in 
the qui tam context because the next relator might seize the chance to bring 
home their share of the reward and not care about enforcing the AFFH 
duties.295  This issue will be discussed in Parts II.B and III.B. 
3.  Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation 
As discussed in Part I.A.2, housing markets are complicated organisms 
that have developed powers to remain segregated despite prohibition of 
discrimination and very slight racial preferences.296  In a piece entitled 
Judging Remedies:  Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation,297 Yale 
Law School Professor Peter Schuck explores the interaction between the 
complexity of the housing market and judicial efforts to desegregate 
communities.298  In analyzing the successes and failures of three prominent 
housing desegregation cases, including the previously mentioned 
Gautreaux case, Schuck made four principal observations:  (1) the housing 
market’s “persuasive influence over housing choices” often “constrains” 
and “distorts” attempts by the government and judiciary to influence the 
choices,299 (2) “a ubiquitous classism rejects the idea that people should 
have a right to live in a neighborhood they cannot afford,” (3) “politically 
mobilized communities strongly oppose the kinds of diversity the courts 
have mandated,” and (4) “courts possess only the crudest, most limited 
 
 290. 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 291. Fiss, supra note 286, at 19. 
 292. See Chayes, supra note 23, at 1302. 
 293. See Fiss, supra note 286, at 20. 
 294. See id. 
 295. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text (discussing the derivative nature of 
the qui tam suit). 
 296. Schuck, supra note 66, at 366; see also supra Part I.A.2 (describing two theories that 
may explain the staying power of residential segregation). 
 297. 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2002). 
 298. Schuck, supra note 66, at 289 (discussing “how the law has defined and handled the 
goal of residential diversity”). 
 299. See supra notes 54–71 (discussing two ways the housing markets distort 
governmental intervention). 
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tools for [creating] diversity amid these obstacles.”300  Schuck found that 
when courts use “command-and-control” approaches in which they order 
very specific decrees and are not reticent to the very political nature of their 
entrenchment into the housing market, they are often met with hostility and 
are not successful in desegregating the community.301  When courts impose 
their will on a community without recognizing the strong backlash that this 
is likely to create, the remedy often fails to improve conditions in the 
community.  Although Schuck focuses on remedy, this theory is applicable 
to the question of whether qui tam and enforcement of AFFH duties will 
succeed in positively impacting the problem of residential segregation—to 
be discussed further in Parts III and IV. 
II.  DISSECTING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  ARE QUI TAM ACTIONS BASED ON 
STATE OR MUNICIPAL “ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS” BARRED? 
Part I framed the problem of residential segregation and introduced the 
main tool used to combat segregation’s continued existence—AFFH duties 
imposed on HUD and HUD grantees.  Especially pertinent to the subjects to 
which the Note now turns, Part I.D presented a circuit split that has the 
potential to decrease the applicability of qui tam actions to enforce AFFH 
duties.  Part II analyzes each side of this conflict. 
Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions function at the crossroad of two 
complicated statutory schemes.302  Along one axis of this crossroads, a 
combination of the FHA and regulations imposed by HUD, requires HUD 
grantees to conduct an AI to fair housing, to analyze the impact of racial 
impediments, and finally to certify that this analysis has been conducted in 
compliance with HUD regulations as a precondition of receiving funds.303  
Along the other axis, the qui tam provisions of the FCA attempt to filter out 
parasitic actions brought by opportunistic relators.  In order for an Anti-
Discrimination Center-type action to succeed, the relator must avoid the 
public disclosure bar by successfully arguing that the AI report garnered 
through a FOIA-type request is not an “administrative report” under prong 
two of the public disclosure analysis or, alternatively, argue that the relator 
is an “original source” under prong three.304   
This section will examine three approaches taken in interpreting prong 
two and the application of the meaning of “administrative report” to a state 
or municipal report such as an AI report.  The Third Circuit has held that a 
state or municipal report garnered through a FOIA-type request is not an 
“administrative report” because § 3730(e)(4)(A) provides a narrow 
 
 300. Schuck, supra note 66, at 366. 
 301. Id. at 368 (noting a judge’s “use [of a] simple dualistic categories to explain complex 
phenomena” and the resulting failure to integrate the community). 
 302. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608 (2006); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729–3733. 
 303. FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 9, at i–iii (describing the consolidated 
plan and the certification that communities will affirmatively further fair housing as “a 
condition of receiving Federal funds”). 
 304. See supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text. 
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definition of the bar and such a reading is consistent with the “purpose and 
tenor” of the 1986 Amendments.305  The Eighth Circuit, in finding that 
reports garnered through FOIA-type requests are “administrative reports,” 
argues that the Third Circuit approach leads to “anomalous” results.306  The 
Ninth Circuit sides with the Eighth Circuit and finds that the state/federal 
distinction advanced by the Third Circuit is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit 
precedent and legislative intent behind the FCA.307   
A.  The Third Circuit Approach 
The Third Circuit was the first of the three circuit courts to weigh in on 
the issue with its ruling in United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of 
Delaware.308  Dunleavy, the relator, claimed that an agreement between the 
County of Delaware (the County) and the federal government required the 
County to follow certain HUD regulations that limited the ways in which 
the County could spend HUD funds and imposed a requirement to submit 
an annual Grantee Performance Report (GPR) to HUD.309  He further 
alleged that the County violated this agreement when it acquired a tract of 
land with HUD funds that was not eligible to be purchased under the 
agreement.310  Dunleavy claimed that this action triggered the reporting 
requirement provisions of the agreement:  when the County failed to report 
the purchase and return the HUD funds, it effectively fraudulently accepted 
the funds from the government.311  The County countered that the facts of 
this purchase were not only “publicly disclosed” under the first prong of the 
public disclosure bar analysis, but were also disclosed, under prong two, 
through an enumerated mode of disclosure—an “administrative report.”312  
The disclosure occurred in a GPR that the County was required to submit to 
HUD as part of the reporting scheme mandated in the agreement between 
the County and HUD.313  The report was fraudulent because it contained 
the misrepresented state of facts:  non-disclosure of the impermissible 
purchase of the tract of land.314  The Third Circuit used four theories to 
support its finding that the GPR is not an “administrative report” as used in 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 
 305. See infra notes 308–46 and accompanying text. 
 306. See infra notes 347–68 and accompanying text. 
 307. See infra notes 357–73 and accompanying text.  
 308. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 745–46 (3d Cir. 
1997) (holding that a county report is not an “administrative report” as used in 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), but not citing to any precedent on this point). 
 309. Id. at 735–36. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 736–37. 
 312. Id. at 743–44. 
 313. Id. at 735–36. 
 314. Id. at 743. 
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1.  Section 3730(e)(4)(A) as an Exhaustive List 
There is circuit court precedent for the proposition that the list of 
enumerated sources in § 3730(e)(4)(A) is exhaustive.315  The Third Circuit 
argued that construction of the list, and more specifically the fact that 
Congress did not qualify the list through the use of “such as” or “for 
example,” allows the inference that the list is exhaustive.316  The court used 
the exclusive character of the list to transition to more specific arguments 
for a narrow definition of administrative reports:  “[t]he only way to bring 
the GPR, prepared by the County, with, the language of § 3730(e)(4)(A) is 
for the GPR to be considered an ‘administrative . . . report.’”317 
After deciding that the public disclosure bar only applies to those modes 
of disclosure that are enumerated in § 3730(e)(4)(A), the court turned to 
how to interpret “administrative report” as used in § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
2.  Doctrine of Noscitur a Sociis 
The unqualified use of “administrative reports” in § 3730(e)(4)(A) makes 
it difficult to determine the intentions of Congress.318  The court points out 
that Congress has “provided no clear legislative intent or meaning for it in 
the FCA.”319  There are no distinctions between federal and state 
administrative reports in the statute.320  In some of these circumstances, 
where a “word [is] usable in many contexts and with various shades of 
meaning,” the Supreme Court has turned to the doctrine of noscitur a 
sociis.321  The doctrine allows the meaning of a given word to be enhanced 
by the surrounding words.322  For example, in Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & 
Co.,323 the Supreme Court used the doctrine to determine what an otherwise 
ambiguous use of “discovery” meant within the context of a tax statute.324  
 
 315. Cf. United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that the enumerated modes of disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A) are the only modes that 
trigger the public disclosure bar); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 
323 (2d Cir. 1992) (arguing that the list in § 3730(e)(4)(A) is exclusive); United States ex 
rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting the absence of the 
words “such as” or “for example” and arguing that there is nothing to “indicate that [the 
enumerated modes] are only examples of the types of ‘public disclosure’ to which the 
jurisdictional bar would apply”); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 
F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting the district court’s argument that § 3730(e)(4)(A) 
denies jurisdiction over “actions based on disclosures other than those specified”). 
 316. See Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 744 (quoting Williams, 931 F.2d at 1499–1500). 
 317. Id. (omission in original). 
 318. Id. at 745. 
 319. Id. 
 320. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1839 (2008) (applying “the 
common sense canon of noscitur a sociis—which counsels that a word is given more precise 
content by the neighboring words with which it is associated”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 
Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004) (remarking that interpretation of a single word is not 
a process by which an abstract meaning of the word is sought; instead, “we are seeking the 
meaning of the whole phrase”). 
 321. Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). 
 322. Id. (stating that “a word is known by the company it keeps”). 
 323. 367 U.S. 303 (1961). 
 324. Id. at 306–07. 
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The Court used the entire list found in the tax statute—“exploration,” 
“discovery,” and “prospecting”—to come to the conclusion that 
“discovery” only applies to “discovery” of oil, gas, and mineral 
resources.325 
The Third Circuit applied this doctrine to the “administrative report” as 
used in § 3730(e)(4)(A):  “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a 
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, 
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media.”326  Focusing on 
the statute’s reference to Congress and “Government Accounting Office,” 
the court noted that both referents are entities of the federal government.327  
The court found “it hard to believe that the drafters of this provision 
intended the word ‘administrative’ to refer to both state and federal reports 
when it lies sandwiched between modifiers which are unquestionably 
federal in character.”328  Of course, the bread of the Third Circuit’s 
“sandwich” can only be considered to be a modifier when the doctrine of 
noscitur a sociis is applied, which is not something other circuits are 
comfortable doing.329 
Application of noscitur a sociis allowed the Third Circuit to conclude 
that § 3730(e)(4)(A) only implicated federal “administrative reports.”330  
Since the GPR was “prepared by” the County, the court concluded that it 
did not come within the meaning of federal “administrative reports.”331  It 
is true that the report was “prepared by” the County, but it was prepared for 
the federal government.332  This second point is not mentioned in the 
opinion, but is highlighted by both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.333 
3.  “Information Dynamic”334 
In addition to using statutory interpretation, the Third Circuit found 
functional support for the distinction between federal and state 
administrative reports.  The FCA was designed as a tool to ferret out fraud 
against the government.335  The qui tam provisions reflect a view that the 
 
 325. Id. at 306–12. 
 326. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 327. See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 328. Id. (emphasis added). 
 329. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(“We reject the Third Circuit’s textual approach and conclude that Medicaid compliance 
audits and audit reports conducted and prepared by the state agency authorized to administer 
this cooperative federal/state program are public disclosures within the meaning of 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A).”). 
 330. See Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 333. United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F.3d 914, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2006); see 
Hays, 325 F.3d at 988. 
 334. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 335. See supra notes 177–82 and accompanying text (describing the reason Congress 
enacted the FCA). 
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government has imperfect information on where the fraud is occurring.336  
Furthermore, in a situation such as Dunleavy, where the party accused of 
the fraud is required to submit reports to the government, the reports “have 
been compiled and produced by a party whose principal motivation 
(assuming the truth of the fraud claim) is the elimination of the paper 
trail.”337  The court inferred from the general purpose of the FCA that this 
was a case where Congress would want to allow the qui tam action.338  The 
court did not want to create a scenario in which entities that enter into 
contracts with the government could effectively absolve themselves from 
FCA repercussions by submitting false reports to the government.339 
4.  The “Purpose and Tenor” of the 1986 Amendments340 
The FCA has been through two major revisions since its enactment in 
1863.341  Each revision was an attempt by Congress to find the right 
balance between incentivizing beneficial relators and discouraging 
opportunistic relators.342  The 1986 amendments reflected Congress’s view 
that the 1943 amendments instituted a version of the public disclosure bar 
that prevented too many beneficial qui tam suits from being initiated.343  
Prior to the 1986 amendments, the standard barred qui tam suits “based 
upon evidence or information in the possession of the United States.”344  
The Dunleavy court reasoned that barring qui tam suits “based on” county 
reports would be an effective repeal of the 1986 amendments and a 
reversion to the public disclosure bar scheme of the 1943 amendments.345  
Similar to the “information dynamic” reasoning, the court did not think 
Congress intended to create a situation where simply because the report is 
in the possession of the federal government, the party committing the fraud 
is absolved.  This scenario was especially troublesome to the court when the 
government files the papers away and “there is [no] reason to give them 
close attention.”346  Based on the confluence of these four theories 
presented by the Dunleavy court, the Third Circuit seems committed to 
ensuring that the FCA is an effective tool to ferret out fraud. 
 
 336. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 745 (noting that FCA reflects a “perceived . . . existence of ‘a 
conspiracy of silence’ to defraud the federal government”). 
 337. Id. 
 338. See id. at 745–46. 
 339. See id. at 745. 
 340. Id. 
 341. See supra notes 182–94 and accompanying text (reviewing the history of FCA 
amendments). 
 342. See supra notes 182–94 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text (explaining the criticisms of the 
public disclosure bar in the 1943 amendments). 
 344. See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, Pub. L. No. 78-215, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006)). 
 345. Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 746 (“The expansion of the FCA’s definition of 
‘administrative report’ to state and local government reports would in effect return us to the 
unduly restrictive ‘government knowledge’ standard.”). 
 346. Id. 
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B.  The Eighth Circuit Approach 
The Eighth Circuit was the next circuit court to decide whether state or 
municipal reports constituted “administrative reports” within the meaning 
of § 3730(e)(4)(A).347  In Hays, the court distinguished and partially 
rejected the Dunleavy reasoning, determining that Medicare and Medicaid 
audit reports produced by a nursing home and submitted to the federal 
government constituted “administrative reports” and therefore FCA actions 
“based upon” these reports were barred.348 
1.  Dunleavy Leads to “Anomalous” Results 
The Hays court rejected the Dunleavy court’s textual approach to the 
issue based on the belief that the strict federal/state dichotomy produces 
“anomalous results.”349  When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it 
explicitly defined “claim” in such a way to include Medicare or Medicaid 
reports submitted to state agencies within the definition.350  This was done 
in an effort to allow FCA actions to be brought where “there is significant 
Federal regulation and involvement.”351  Through the definition of “claim,” 
Congress opened up FCA actions to a wide range of those situations, 
including those in which the federal government is fulfilling the claim.352  
The inquiry relevant to determining whether or not a request for payment is 
a “claim” within the meaning of the statute is whether the federal 
government is “significant[ly]” involved in the program.  The court 
reasoned that it would not be consistent to ignore the federal/state 
distinction for purposes of the “claim” inquiry and make the same 
distinction determinative for purposes of the “administrative report” 
inquiry. 
2.  “Prepared By or at the Behest of the Relevant Federal Agency” 
Like the other circuit courts, the Hays court acknowledged that the 
enumerated modes of public disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A) constitute an 
exhaustive list and is therefore required to come up with a theory as to what 
is included within the definition of “administrative reports.”353  The court 
looked to two cases that involved parties other than the federal government 
that produced audit reports “at the behest of” the federal government.354  In 
Minnesota Association of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System 
 
 347. United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2003) (remarking 
that the application of “administrative reports” has lead to “divergent judicial 
interpretation”). 
 348. See id. at 989. 
 349. Id. at 988. 
 350. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Sec. 2, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153, 
3154 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)). 
 351. Hays, 325 F.3d at 988. 
 352. Id. at 985. 
 353. Id. at 988. 
 354. Id.  
2010] PROMOTING RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION 1415 
Corp.,355 the Eighth Circuit determined that an audit conducted by a private 
insurer as part of a program administered by the federal government 
constituted an “administrative audit”—which is one of the enumerated 
modes of disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A).356  Reliance on this case is 
questionable, as the Nurse Anesthetists court provides no support for its 
reasoning and mentions it only in passing—the court determines that the 
audit conducted by the private insurance company is not relevant to the 
appeal.357  In United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp.,358 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia expressed a view that an 
audit prepared by an outside accounting firm at the “behest of” the federal 
government satisfied the public disclosure bar.359  The parties in Schwedt 
did not argue that the audit did not constitute an “administrative report” and 
therefore reliance on this case is also questionable.360 
The Eighth Circuit’s strongest argument is a functional analysis of how 
the FCA fits into the Medicaid fraud detection scheme.361  The court 
described Medicaid as “a cooperative federal-state program through which 
the federal government provides financial assistance to help states furnish 
health care to the poor.”362  Medicaid regulations specify that states must 
audit, records of those parties claiming payment through Medicaid.363  
Furthermore, if the federal government receives a complaint of fraud, it 
defers to the states to investigate, “setting the stage for either federal or state 
criminal or civil enforcement actions.”364  The Hays court distinguished 
Dunleavy on the grounds that the grantee compliance audits, which 
complement the GPR at issue in Dunleavy, are conducted by the federal 
government and not the states, as is the case with Medicaid audits.365  The 
Hays court focused on the function the audit report plays in the reporting 
scheme and found that since the Medicaid reporting scheme relies on states 
instead of the federal government, it satisfies the public disclosure bar.366  
The Hays court accurately distinguished Dunleavy, but failed to fully 
 
 355. 276 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 356. Id. at 1044. 
 357. See id. at 1043–44 (describing an audit conducted by a private insurer as an 
“administrative audit” within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A) in a sentence that is explaining 
the defendant’s position on appeal and not expressing the courts view on whether an audit by 
a private insurance company should be considered an “administrative audit”). 
 358. 39 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 359. Id. at 31–33. 
 360. See id. at 31–36 (focusing on the “allegation or transaction language” and “based 
upon” of § 3730(e)(4)(A) and not discussing whether the audit constituted an “administrative 
audit”). 
 361. See United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(describing the Medicaid fraud detection scheme). 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. (“Congress did not delegate [the audit program at issue in Dunleavy] to a state 
agency, as is the case with Medicaid.”). 
 366. Id. at 989. 
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explain why this distinction matters.367  It seems as though the Hays court 
made a judgment that the FCA is less important to the Medicaid fraud 
detection scheme than it is to HUD’s fraud detection scheme in 
Dunleavy.368 
C.  The Ninth Circuit Approach 
The Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hays through 
its decision in United States ex rel. Bly-Magee v. Premo.369  In Bly-Magee, 
the relator, Bly-Magee, accused the California Department of Rehabilitation 
(CDR) of defrauding the federal government by “violat[ing] federal 
procurement standards in awarding contracts, forc[ing] the Government to 
‘purchase unnecessary and duplicative services’,” and “falsely certif[ying] 
that [CDR] had conducted audits.”370  Bly-Magee brought a series of suits 
under the FCA, but at issue in this instance of the series was whether the 
“public disclosure” of facts underlying the action in a published audit report 
produced by the California State Auditor constituted an “administrative 
report” under the FCA—which would trigger the public disclosure bar.371 
1.  Likelihood of Discovering Fraud is “Heightened” 
The Ninth Circuit previously decided that state and local administrative 
hearings were sources of public disclosure under § 3730(e)(4)(A).372  From 
this precedent, the Court reasoned that it would be incongruous to apply a 
federal versus state distinction for “administrative audits” but not for 
“administrative hearings.”373  Buttressing this point with functional 
reasoning similar to that found in Hays, the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he 
likelihood that the information will be brought to the federal government’s 
attention is heightened in cases . . . where the audited program is connected 
significantly to federal regulations and funds.”374  The court noted that 
CDR provides services through federal and state funds within the context of 
federal legislation.  “Essentially, CDR’s operation depends on federal 
funding and compliance with federal regulations.”375  Furthermore, the 
federal regulation requires the state to form a committee to supply progress 
 
 367. See id. (stating “while we do not disagree with the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Dunleavy, we conclude the court ruled more broadly than necessary in stating that a state 
agency disclosure may never be an ‘administrative . . . report [or] audit’ for purposes of 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A),” but not explaining why Dunleavy does not fit in the functional description 
of the Medicaid program (alteration in original)). 
 368. Cf. id. 
 369. 470 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We agree with the Eighth Circuit and now hold 
that the second category of sources includes non-federal reports, audits, and investigations.”) 
 370. Id. at 917 (quoting the complaint). 
 371. Id. 
 372. See A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“The extensive public agency proceedings conducted by the Counties plainly fall within the 
ambit of ‘administrative hearing[s]’ under § 3730(e)(4)(A).” (alteration in original)). 
 373. Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 918 (“The federal government is no less likely to obtain 
information from a state administrative audit than it is from a state administrative hearing.”). 
 374. Id. at 918–19. 
 375. Id. at 919. 
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reports to the federal government.376  The Bly-Magee court viewed the facts 
in that case as more closely aligned with Hays than Dunleavy.377  Like the 
Hays court, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that when the fraud detection 
scheme heavily relies on state participation, the public disclosure bar is 
triggered.378 
2.  Dunleavy Does Not Lead to Anomalous Results 
Noting that the Third Circuit in Dunleavy feared creating a situation in 
which the state or municipal agency could absolve itself from liability by 
submitting a false report, the Bly-Magee court did not think these concerns 
applied to its facts.379  The Dunleavy court thought that an agency might 
craft a report in such a way as to disclose enough facts to trigger the public 
disclosure bar, but conceal other facts that would tip off the relevant federal 
agency.380  The Ninth Circuit first distinguished the facts of Dunleavy from 
those of Bly-Magee by arguing that in Bly-Magee the state auditor who 
conducts the audit was independent from the report producing agency.381  
This seems to undercut the Dunleavy reasoning as applied to Bly-Magee, 
but the Ninth Circuit was not finished with the critique of the Dunleavy 
“information dynamic” reasoning.382  The Ninth Circuit proceeded to 
astutely note that the situation feared by Dunleavy was not likely to 
occur.383  In order for the public disclosure bar to be triggered, the 
“allegations or transactions” underlying the fraud must appear in a public 
disclosure.384  It is exceedingly unlikely that a state or municipal agency 
would be able to toe the very narrow line between disclosing enough 
information to truly disclose the “allegations or transactions” of the fraud 
without tipping off the authorities to the fraud.385  The court noted that 
“[t]he public disclosure of ‘mere information’ relating to the claims was 
insufficient to trigger a jurisdictional bar to the False Claims suit.”386 
 
 376. Id. 
 377. See id. at 918–19 (distinguishing Dunleavy and analogizing to Hays). 
 378. Id. at 919. (9th Cir. 2006) (analogizing to Hays because of the “significant federal 
regulation and cooperation”). 
 379. Id. (“Finally, our interpretation of § 3730(e)(4)(A) does not create the anomalous 
situation feared by the court in Dunleavy.”). 
 380. See id. (characterizing Dunleavy); see also supra notes 308–14 and accompanying 
text (describing the facts of Dunleavy). 
 381. Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 919; cf. supra notes 308–14 and accompanying text. 
 382. See supra notes 315–20 and accompanying text. 
 383. Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 919 (“The court feared that legitimate qui tam suits thus 
could be barred on the ground that the allegations were disclosed in reports or audits 
produced by the entity accused of fraud.  This fear is unfounded in this case . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 384. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (providing that “[n]o court 
shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions” in the enumerated modes of public disclosure); see also supra 
note 211 (explaining how much information is required to constitute “public disclosure”). 
 385. See Bly-Magee, 470 F.3d at 919. 
 386. Id. 
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III.  ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS REPORTS SHOULD SURVIVE THE PUBLIC 
DISCLOSURE BAR 
Part I supplied a primer in residential segregation, the AFFH duties, and 
how qui tam might be used to enforce those duties.  Part II set up the circuit 
split conflict over whether Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions should 
be allowed to use the qui tam mechanism.  Part III will conclude that these 
actions should survive the public disclosure bar. 
The ability of relators such as the Center to bring qui tam actions against 
county and municipal authorities to enforce AFFH obligations depends on 
the relators’ ability to use the authority’s AI report as the basis for liability.  
The FCA was enacted to encourage those with information of fraud against 
the government to come forward, but the countervailing goal of limiting 
parasitic relators from beating the government to the courthouse led to the 
eventual enactment of the modern public disclosure bar.387  The public 
disclosure bar prevents qui tam suits that are “based on” public disclosure 
of “administrative reports” within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A).388  The 
next court to decide an Anti-Discrimination Center-type action will be 
confronted with the issue of whether AI reports constitute “administrative 
reports.”  This Note will proceed to argue that the next court should follow 
Judge Cote’s lead and hold that AI reports are not “administrative reports” 
and are therefore available to be used as a basis for a qui tam action to 
enforce AFFH obligations. 
All three circuits to consider the issue recognize that modes of disclosure 
listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A) cannot apply to all “administrative reports” or 
“audits.”389  These words are simply too broad by themselves and would 
include too much under the public disclosure bar.390  There are very few 
clues hidden in the statute and virtually no legislative history on what 
“administrative reports” means.391  The courts are forced to determine 
whether Congress would have intended to include a given mode of 
disclosure based on the purposes behind the FCA and the public disclosure 
bar.392  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits make strong arguments for including 
reports produced by the states and submitted to the federal government 
within the FCA’s public disclosure bar.  However, it is highly unlikely that 
Congress intended the courts to make a state/federal distinction in the case 
of federal housing programs—but not in the case of federal healthcare 
programs.  Thus, we must come to a definitive answer on whether state 
administrative reports are “administrative reports” within the meaning of § 
3730(e)(4)(A). 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits make their strongest arguments when they 
attempt to distinguish their respective cases from Dunleavy through a 
comparison of the reporting schemes involved in both cases.  Dunleavy 
 
 387. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text. 
 388. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 389. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 390. See supra notes 313–15, 353, 379–86 and accompanying text. 
 391. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text. 
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dealt with a HUD GPR produced by a county government and supplied to 
HUD for potential auditing.393  Hays and Bly-Magee dealt with an audit 
report produced by a state health agency, submitted to the federal 
government with the potential to be audited by a state auditor.394  The Hays 
and Bly-Magee courts correctly identify a major difference in the reporting 
structure in that a state auditor, independent from the state agency that 
prepares the report, is responsible for auditing the report and detecting 
fraud.395  However the distinction is immaterial when analyzed in context 
with the purpose of the FCA. 
Underlying the reasoning in Hays seems to be an assumption that the 
federally mandated reporting structure was sufficient to detect fraud and did 
not need to be supplemented by the FCA.396  This interpretation seems to 
confuse the relationship between the FCA, the FCA’s public disclosure bar, 
and the purpose underlying each.  First and foremost, the purpose of the 
FCA is to increase the federal government’s ability to recover money lost to 
fraud.397  It was not created to supplement an already sophisticated federal 
fraud-detecting scheme.  Instead, it was an acknowledgement of the fact 
that the government was ineffective at detecting fraud.398  The modern 
public disclosure bar was developed because parasitic Marcus-type actions 
were recognized as undesirable.399  The public disclosure bar functions as 
an exception to the general rule that the government wants to discover 
fraud.400  The exceptions laid out in § 3730(e)(4)(A) should be interpreted 
within the context of what Congress intended to create with the 
exceptions—a mechanism to prevent relators from bringing parasitic qui 
tam suits.401  The Hays court seems to incorrectly analyze the issue from 
the opposite perspective and positions the inquiry as determining whether 
fraud detection is needed in a given situation.402 
Framing the inquiry of interpreting § 3730(e)(4)(A) from the perspective 
of whether a given mode of disclosure creates a substantial likelihood of 
parasitic actions aligns with the purpose of the public disclosure bar.  
Viewed in this way, there does not seem to be a reason to be especially 
worried about administrative reports that are produced by state agencies.  In 
the case of administrative reports produced by the federal government, it is 
assumed that the government has knowledge of the report, which leads to a 
high likelihood that an FCA action “based upon” such reports would be 
parasitic.  In the case of AI reports, there is less reason to be suspicious of 
potentially parasitic claims.  The AI report is never actually submitted to 
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HUD.  HUD requires that the analysis be conducted and lays out specific 
requirements, such as the requirement to analyze racial impediments, but 
never audits the report. 
Although this Note rejects the Hays court’s “where do we need fraud 
detection” reasoning, such reasoning supports a determination that AI 
reports and other similar reports should not be barred.  HUD is a massive 
federal organization with an annual budget of nearly forty-two billion 
dollars.  Almost eight billion dollars are distributed by CDBG programs 
through an extremely complicated fund granting mechanism.403  First, the 
would-be grantees conduct an AI, produce and submit a Consolidated Plan, 
submit certifications that they will “affirmatively further fair housing,” and 
submit more certifications that they will comply with a long list of other 
regulations.  Second, an arcane formula determines whether a given 
community will receive funds and, if they are to receive funds, how 
much.404  Finally the money is distributed and the grantees are charged with 
complying with the complex regulatory scheme.   
Qui tam was developed for this exact scenario.  The government is 
overextended:  it has developed a regulatory scheme so complicated that it 
could never enforce it.  The government is at a disadvantage because the 
compliance or non-compliance with the regulations is spread thinly across 
fifty states and is extremely nuanced.  Take, for example, Westchester’s 
non-compliance, which was only evidenced in an AI report and the non-
existence of subsidized housing in predominantly white communities.  
Fraud detection is very difficult in these situations.  The FCA is needed and 
there is no substantial likelihood of parasitic action.  HUD is another 
example of numerous federal agencies that operate in a similar manner.  
Complicated regulations disperse billions of dollars every year.  When 
states, counties, or municipalities produce reports such as the AI report, the 
report should not be barred from being the basis of a qui tam suit.  This 
situation does not present a high likelihood of producing parasitic suits and 
is consistent with the general rule that the FCA is designed to detect fraud 
when the government is at an information disadvantage.405 
If the problem is analyzed from the perspective of whether the FCA 
served its purpose in Anti-Discrimination Center, the answer is almost self-
evident.  Westchester was in noncompliance for a seven-year period.406  
Throughout this period Westchester ignored HUD directives and continued 
to perform its AI without considering racial impediments.  The government 
never received or audited the AI reports and relied on Westchester’s 
certification.  The information required to detect the fraud was hidden in the 
AI report.  Only a party in the Center’s position with the requisite 
knowledge and motivation to detect the fraud could have alerted the 
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government. The next court confronted with an Anti-Discrimination-type 
action should allow the AI to form the basis of the qui tam action. 
IV.  ENFORCEMENT OF AFFH DUTIES THROUGH QUI TAM:  WHERE DOES 
QUI TAM FIT IN THE “PUBLIC LAW” LITIGATION FRAMEWORK? 
Part III concluded that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions and the 
requisite AI reports garnered through FOIA requests should survive the 
FCA’s public disclosure bar.  Part IV analyzes whether Anti-
Discrimination-type actions have the potential to succeed as “public law” 
litigation. 
A.  Disadvantages of Using Qui Tam 
1.  Representation of the Parties 
Professor Fiss warned that representation of the victims in “public law” 
litigation can be complicated.407  The outcome of the case will affect those 
before the court, similarly situated parties, and even parties that are not now 
but will be similarly situated in the future.408  In “public law” litigation it is 
important for the judge to determine if the victims are properly 
represented.409  These concerns are magnified by Anti-Discrimination 
Center-type actions. 
The qui tam provisions of the FCA provide that anyone can bring an 
action in the name of the government so long as they meet the various 
requirements of the FCA.410  The FCA was not designed as a civil rights 
enforcement mechanism.411  Instead, the government hoped to tap the 
public’s knowledge of fraud and resources to litigate on behalf of the 
government by providing a substantial monetary reward.  This created a 
problem beyond Fiss’s worst nightmare:  a situation where the 
representative of the injured class has completely divergent interests from 
the individuals that make up the injured class.412  Extending this 
hypothetical, the relator would initiate the action in the hopes of garnering a 
hefty sum of the fraudulent claim.  Imagine that this greedy, parasitic413 
relator brought the suit against Westchester.  With Westchester’s back up 
against the wall, facing treble damages amounting to $180 million, the 
greedy relator does not settle.  Instead of receiving Westchester’s 
affirmative guarantee that Westchester will build hundreds of homes and 
locate them in compliance with its AFFH duties, the residents of 
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Westchester receive nothing more than a tax increase to pay the treble 
damages. 
While this example assumes that the government did not decide to 
intervene during any stage of the trial, it is not out of the realm of 
possibilities:414 the United States did not intervene for the first three years 
of the Anti-Discrimination Center litigation.415  Furthermore, the procedural 
rule that allows the government to intervene arguably worked to the 
Center’s disadvantage at the time of settlement.  In approving the 
settlement, Judge Cote stipulated that the Monitor charged with assuring 
Westchester’s compliance would be appointed at the sole discretion of the 
United States.  Most recently, the Center has expressed criticism of the 
Monitor’s commitment to enforce the settlement exactly as it was written 
and signed by the parties.  The intervention rule allows the same 
government that failed to detect Westchester’s noncompliance for seven 
years to have the final say on how the settlement is implemented and strips 
the Center of its role in the implementation.416 
2.  Solving Structural Problems within HUD and Municipalities 
Gautreaux is a paradigmatic example of “public law” litigation being 
used to restructure institutions.417  The defendants, CHA and HUD, had 
intentionally placed minority residents in minority neighborhoods in 
violation of the constitutional rights of the residents.418  This action resulted 
in true structural change; as a result of the action, both CHA and HUD were 
required to significantly change their institutional behavior.419  It might be 
argued that Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions do not have the reach 
required to change institutional behavior to the degree that more traditional 
desegregation actions do.  In the case of Westchester, the annual grant and 
length of the claim period created a large enough penalty that Westchester 
was forced to settle.420  It is possible to imagine a municipality with a 
smaller annual grant and a shorter false claims period.  In this situation, the 
municipality might simply pay the treble damages required under the FCA 
instead of settling.  It is true that if the municipality continues to participate 
in HUD programs, then it will likely modify its institutional behavior so 
that it will not be liable for a penalty—but the municipality could 
alternatively simply stop participating in the HUD program.  This is in 
contrast to Gautreaux, where an injunctive order was going to be the 
remedy if there was a finding of liability.421  It could be argued that the 
wrong committed in Gautreaux was more serious, and therefore the more 
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substantive remedy makes sense, but nonetheless the ability for the 
defendant in a qui tam action simply to pay a fine limits its effectiveness in 
effecting structural change. 
3.  Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation 
Professor Schuck distinguishes between a “command-and-control” 
remedy that imposes a segregation ideal on a community and a more 
political approach that takes into account the resistance that the remedy is 
likely to meet.422  Schuck concludes, based on a thorough analysis of 
residential segregation cases, that the former—the more authoritarian 
remedies—tend not to be successful.423  From this perspective, it might be 
argued that the treble damages provision of the FCA actually gave the 
United States and the Center too much bargaining power.424  The remedy 
achieved by the United States and the Center in the settlement was quite 
significant.  It required Westchester to build specific numbers of affordable 
homes in the very communities that were opposed to affordable housing 
being built.425  The opposition is evident by analyzing the distribution of 
affordable housing placement during the false claims period and is 
supported by Professor Schuck’s observation that “a ubiquitous classism 
rejects the idea that people should have a right to live in a neighborhood 
they cannot afford.”426  If this is in fact what is occurring in Westchester, 
there may be a strong argument that such a settlement is likely to fail.427 
B.  Advantages of Using Qui Tam 
1.  Representation of the Parties 
Professor Fiss not only commented on the extra caution judges should 
use when appraising representatives of “public law” litigants, but he noted 
that “public law” litigants tend to be vulnerable and should not be forced to 
volunteer as the group’s representative.428  Qui tam allows enforcement of 
the HUD grantee’s AFFH duties without the need for an injured party or 
group representation.429  The other benefit qui tam provides is that it allows 
a group such as the Center, which has the requisite knowledge and 
resources to traverse the complicated and overlapping fund granting 
mechanisms, regulatory requirements, and case law, to see the case through 
until settlement.430 
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The procedural rule that allows the United States to intervene at anytime 
during the proceeding is an effective mechanism to protect against relators 
that do not have the best interests of the community residents in mind.431  
The United States even has the opportunity to intervene just prior to 
settlement to broker a deal between the relator, the HUD grantee, and the 
United States.432  So long as the United States intervenes in appropriate 
circumstances, it allows fervent advocates such as the Center to bring 
actions against noncompliant grantees such as Westchester, but provides a 
safeguard against an opportunistic relator. 
2.  Solving Structural Problems Within HUD and Municipalities 
The qui tam action has the power to effect structural change within the 
institutions of HUD and HUD grantees in two ways.  First, the prospect of 
treble damages pushes the parties toward a settlement.433  The United States 
and the Center had the clear advantage—leveraging the potential of a $180 
million fine.434  This leverage only increases the relator’s ability to impact 
the structure of HUD and HUD grantees.  In Anti-Discrimination Center, 
Westchester agreed to some fairly extraordinary terms, including to expend 
the same amount of money they received while making false certifications 
to remedy their noncompliance.435  This only seems fair, but the way in 
which Westchester is spending the money is more interesting.  Westchester 
has agreed to build the vast majority of the affordable homes in highly 
concentrated white areas.  Even AFFH duties would not require the 
stringent requirements included in the settlement.436  This is evidence of 
immediate structural change on the part of Westchester County.437 
Second, the qui tam suit leads to structural change by providing an 
example to other HUD grantees.  This mode of structural change is 
especially effective in the case of enforcing AFFH through qui tam because 
the question of liability under this structure is actually quite straightforward.  
The Anti-Discrimination Center litigation provides other HUD grantees 
with a simple message:  conduct a compliant AI, which includes an analysis 
of racial impediments to fair housing, or else you could be liable under the 
FCA. 
3.  Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation 
Qui tam has the power to positively impact segregation through the 
enforcement of AFFH duties.  Enforcement through a flexible grant 
program such as CDBG alleviates many of the “command-and-control” 
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concerns recognized by Professor Schuck.438  By way of the second mode 
of structural change described above, Anti-Discrimination Center-type 
actions set an example for other HUD grantees.  This triggers the HUD 
grantees to conduct compliant AIs.439  Once the report is produced and the 
grantee has in its possession a document that shows substantial racial 
segregation, the AFFH duty to do something about the racial impediment is 
triggered.440  This all occurs behind the scenes and at all times the grantee 
is in control of the specific measures taken.  If the community does not act 
on these racial impediments, then the grantee is once again open to Anti-
Discrimination Center-type liability.441  So long as visibility of the Anti-
Discrimination Center action triggers the initial move on the part of the 
grantees to conduct a compliant AI, this action has the ability to avoid 
“command-and-control” type remedies and quietly modify the behavior of 
HUD grantees.442 
PART V.  QUI TAM IS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ACHIEVING CHANGE 
The problem of residential segregation is complex.  Segregation was 
thrust upon current generations by the country’s unfortunate past.  Today a 
combination of market idiosyncrasies, community resistance, and lax 
enforcement of AFFH duties have given residential segregation a seemingly 
indefinite life.  This Note has explained that the FHA was not designed to 
directly combat residential segregation.  Furthermore, its sole provision that 
allows advocates to edge communities toward integration has been 
significantly compromised by the lack of a complimentary enforcement 
scheme.  Qui tam is the last hope, if one excludes the possibility of an 
amendment to the FHA, that would allow parties such as the Center to 
directly challenge AFFH violations.  The question is, can qui tam be 
effective in this context?  This Note concludes that the answer is a qualified 
yes. 
A.  Representation of the Parties 
The qualification is related to the first issue we will approach.  Professor 
Fiss eloquently put into words what everyone’s intuition tells them. The 
enforcement of civil rights requires representation of the finest class.443  
Representation is where the Anti-Discrimination Center-type action has the 
potential to go astray.  When a civil rights advocacy group such as the 
Center brings the action, it can be quite effective.  The trouble lies in the 
potential for relators other than advocacy groups.  A relator that institutes a 
suit claiming a HUD grantee has defrauded the government based on AFFH 
certifications could forever quash the community’s right to redress.  The 
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federal government’s power to intervene is not a sufficient protection.  
Housing segregation can be a contentious issue, especially in highly 
segregated communities such as Westchester.  The Department of Justice 
cannot be relied on to uniformly intervene when intervention is needed. 
For this reason it is recommended that the FCA be amended to include a 
provision requiring the presiding judge to investigate the ability of the 
relator to represent affected parties in cases where qui tam is used to 
enforce civil rights such as AFFH duties.  This would guarantee the 
“adequate representation” called for by Professor Fiss.444 
B.  Solving Structural Problems within HUD and Municipalities 
Solving structural problems is where the qui tam action truly shines.  
HUD’s lackluster enforcement of the AFFH duties has likely lulled CDBG 
grantees to sleep.445  Completing the AI as simply an extra step on the road 
to federal dollars is not the correct way to approach the analysis at the heart 
of the only desegregation tool.  Qui tam brings the AI reports out of the 
closet and onto the desk of every HUD grantee that hopes to avoid FCA 
liability.  There may be more than simply liability at stake.  In a sense, 
Westchester has been tarnished as the county that stole from the federal 
government.  Counties similarly situated likely do not want to go through 
years of litigation with the potential of being labeled a sophisticated 
municipal thief. 
The ability of qui tam to impact structural change in the specific agency 
that is the subject of the lawsuit itself is certainly diminished by the fact that 
the agency can simply opt-out of reforming its practices by settling.  
However, for the Westchesters of the world, qui tam is an excellent way to 
achieve structural change.  The settlement is a testament to how powerful 
the treble damages provision is when there is a sufficient level of funding 
and a long enough period of fraud. 
C.  Positively Impacting the Problem of Segregation 
The concern that the treble damages provision equates to a “command-
and-control” approach to the segregation problem is not completely 
unwarranted.  The Westchester officials’ reaction to the suit early on in the 
litigation illustrates that there are strong opinions on both sides of the issue.  
However, it is the complexity of the segregation problem that proves to be a 
stronger force to be reckoned with.  These complexities flow out of the 
work of Professor Tiebout446 and Professor Schelling447 and the political 
elements described by Professor Schuck.448  In order to counteract these 
forces and at least keep pace with the staying power of segregation actions, 
mechanisms like the qui tam and advocates such as the Center are essential. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note traced the historical roots of residential segregation and 
illuminated some characteristics underlying its staying power.  Using this as 
a backdrop, deficiencies of the FHA were identified and the Anti-
Discrimination Center-type action was presented as a potential solution to 
the deficiencies.  This Note concludes that Anti-Discrimination Center-type 
actions have the potential to fill the gap left by the FHA enforcement 
mechanism for two interconnected reasons.  First, reports garnered through 
FOIA requests should be admissible in qui tam suits.  Second, although qui 
tam is not the perfect tool to enforce civil rights, an amendment to the FCA 
would improve Anti-Discrimination Center-type actions by preventing 
parasitic relators from disregarding the true victims of segregation.  Anti-
Discrimination Center should be viewed as a model for future litigants.  
This Note concludes that Congress should inquire as to the connection 
between the FCA and civil rights enforcement and consider amending the 
FCA to ensure sufficient representation of the parties. 
 
